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UAS: UNDERSTANDING THE AIRSPACE OF STATES
STEPHEN J. MIGALA*
ABSTRACT
On August 29, 2016, regulations issued by the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) went into effect that, for the first
time in history, apply only to airspace below 500 feet. At the
same time, in response to concerns over privacy and security,
and the FAA’s delay in issuing these regulations, several states
passed their own laws restricting drones. Simply put, these laws
are on a collision course. The majority of commentators believe
these state laws will be federally preempted, but they are most
likely wrong. Very little attention has been paid to the strong
argument that the FAA may not have authority to exclusively, or
even partially, regulate that airspace, let alone that they cannot
do so to the exclusion of state laws. This article aims to inform
those debates. It highlights statutes used by the FAA, and even
some courts, to assert regulatory authority, and it shows that rel-
evant text in the U.S. Code is misleadingly incomplete and not
actually the law. Also, reviving a hundred years of context, his-
tory, and legislative intent, this article highlights other congres-
sional limitations that the FAA has exceeded. All told, this
article concludes that states can restrict drones over their own
low-lying airspace.
I. INTRODUCTION
AIRSPACE ABOVE the United States has generally beenthought of as governed exclusively at the federal level. For
decades, there was no need to reevaluate this premise simply
because no novel scenarios required its reexamination. Today,
on the cusp of a new age of unmanned aerial vehicles delivering
goods from dealer to doorstep, pervasive intrusions of miniature
* J.D. and LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. Stephen also has an
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cameras floating outside of our homes’ windows, and other
broad privacy and national security implications, it is time to re-
examine whether federal law prevents states from regulating
low-lying airspace.
Indeed, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has re-
cently—and for the first time—asserted its jurisdiction over all
airspace in the United States through statements, fact sheets,
and regulations regarding drones, which are also known as un-
manned aerial systems (UASs). However, for the most part,
these rules and assertions have largely gone unnoticed for their
encroachment on a dormant area of law that never excluded
states from regulating low-lying airspace. With numerous states
now enacting laws that restrict UASs, many presume these laws
will be federally preempted. But a close look at the law will show
little basis for such presumptions.
Upon careful examination of historical context, federal stat-
utes governing airspace, case law, and a preemption analyses,
this article argues that states are not preempted from regulating
the areas below federal “navigable airspace.” In other words,
states can enact laws preventing drone flights below 500 feet
above ground level, regardless of FAA policies or regulations al-
lowing, or not prohibiting, such operation.
This article’s conclusions are based on examinations of mis-
transcribed and miscodified provisions of law in the U.S. Code
that differ from true source law, as well as statutory definitions,
legislative history, historical context, and case law regarding air-
space and preemption analyses.
The implications of this article’s conclusions stand to affect
many other areas of law. A good swath of Fourth Amendment
and government surveillance jurisprudence is based on the no-
tion that one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
where aircraft can legally fly. Thus, allowing states to establish
“no drone zones” in non-navigable airspace will have the direct
effect of establishing privacy norms and reasonable expectations
involving UASs.
By allowing states to keep laws that regulate these “recent in-
ventions and business methods,”1 our society will not only set a
1 A famous phrase taken from a law review article by Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890). Over a hundred years ago, Warren and Brandeis
warned of new “mechanical devices” in the form of portable cameras and “busi-
ness methods” in the form of celebrity journalism, which they foreshadowed
would vastly expand and threaten norms of privacy. Today, the miniaturization
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framework for the development of future commerce, personal
convenience, safety, and security, it will also firmly establish the
bounds of what we choose to hold as “sacred precincts of private
and domestic life.”2
A. THE FLIGHT PLAN
To guide readers through the legal landscape, this article be-
gins, in Part II.A, with a brief background on drones. Next, Part
II.B presents a history and description of the FAA’s drone regu-
lations. Part II.C then examines the FAA’s position on whether
its regulations preempt state law.
Part III is where the heart of this article lies, laying out in
detail the accurate versions of law, definitions, history, context,
and legislative intent that have rarely been found in case law or
other commentaries. Part III.A.1 introduces a mistranscribed
law in the U.S. Code that is often erroneously used to assert fed-
eral control and preemption of all airspace. Afterward, Part
III.A.2 looks at the limited authority Congress granted to the
FAA to regulate only within navigable airspace and not in the
several hundred feet above ground where drones usually oper-
ate. Part III.A.3 then describes the bounds and altitudes of navi-
gable airspace and how those have remained constant for nearly
a century. Part III.A.4 evaluates other authorities on which the
FAA has relied to promulgate its drone regulations and argues
that they do not grant the FAA the powers it claims. Part III.B
examines nearly a century of state regulation of low-lying air-
space and modern efforts to regulate drones. Later, Part III.C
briefly introduces the most relevant case law on airspace, pri-
vacy, government takings, and states’ rights.
Part IV presents a brief preemption analysis, relying heavily
on the deep dive taken in Part III. And after concluding that
most state laws are not preempted, this article clarifies how and
where the FAA can regulate in Part V. All told, this article makes
some novel assertions and hopes to, at the very least, better in-
form a public debate that appears to have overlooked both some
key legal arguments and the historical evolution of our laws on
aviation and airspace.
and aerial portability of common cameras again threatens to bring a paradig-
matic shift to perceptions of personal privacy.
2 Id.
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B. NOMENCLATURE
One other introductory point must be made regarding no-
menclature. Commonly known as “drones,” remote-controlled
or human-less aircraft have many other names depending on
their use or on the speaker. Congress and the FAA use the term
“UAS” to refer to “an aircraft that is operated without the possi-
bility of direct human intervention from within or on the air-
craft.”3 And within that term, they also classify a subset called
small UASs or “sUASs.”4 Meanwhile, most states initially favored
the more overarching and publicly familiar term “drone,” which
is the term even the military first used.5 While attempting to
keep fidelity to the term used in the law that is analyzed, this
article will generally use both UAS and drone interchangeably.
II. BACKGROUND
A. WHY ALL THE BUZZ?
Drones are on their way to becoming commonplace, if not
ubiquitous. In 2015, some estimated that more than 4 million
drones were sold and that sales could increase to 20 million by
2020.6 Moreover, proponents estimate that integrating UASs
into the U.S. national airspace system will have an economic im-
pact of more than $13 billion and 70,000 jobs in only the first
three years.7
3 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 331(8),
126 Stat. 11, 72 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)).
4 Id. § 331(6).
5 Ben Zimmer, The Flight of ‘Drone’ from Bees to Planes, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2013,
7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324110404578625803
736954968 [https://perma.cc/PR3U-3VV8]. The origins of the term “drone” can
be traced to 1935, when a U.S. naval admiral observed a demonstration of a Brit-
ish remote-controlled aircraft, the “Queen Bee,” used for target practice. The
admiral ordered a subordinate to develop something similar for the U.S. Navy,
and that officer used the name drone for his aircraft, in homage to the Queen Bee.
With the slight buzzing sound made by quadcopters, the most common form of
drones, the term drone seems even more appropriate today.
6 Rob Stott, Consumer Drones Sales to Reach Almost 4 Million This Year, 16 Million
by 2020, DEALERSCOPE (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.dealerscope.com/article/
consumer-drones-sales-to-reach-almost-4-million-this-year-16-million-by-2020/2/
[https://perma.cc/8WY7-4FLC] (summarizing a recent Juniper Research
report).
7 ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L (AUVSI), THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2013),
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AUVSI/958c920a-7f9b-4ad2-
9807-f9a4e95d1ef1/UploadedImages/
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The increasing prevalence of drones has raised new questions
about airspace, property rights, security, and privacy. When U.S.
Senator Rand Paul appeared on CNN in January 2015 and
threatened to shoot down any drone over his house,8 he was not
the first person to believe that his property rights extended to
the air above his home. As drones began to proliferate, many
other incidents implicating safety, privacy, and national security
drew national attention. Conspicuously absent from these inci-
dents was any meaningful legal enforcement or any clear indica-
tion as to rules for drones from the FAA.9 Noting a void and
rising public concern, states began to legislate on the issue.10 At
the same time, the FAA, after years of consideration, released its
final rules on sUASs, which went into effect on August 29,
2016.11 With many amateur commentators suggesting that state
laws could be preempted, and with court cases just starting to
examine the issue, this article sets out to inform that discussion.
But first, the FAA’s approach to regulating drones is introduced.
B. FAA’S PART 107 SUAS REGULATIONS
1. FAA Regulation Before the sUAS Final Rule
Prior to the FAA’s new Title 14, Part 107 regulations, the FAA
considered all UASs to be “aircraft” generally and restricted
their use, unless operators had an exemption or used them ac-
New_Economic%20Report%202013%20Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/WHF4-
UVFK].
8 Adam B. Lerner, Rand Paul: I’d Shoot a Drone Out of the Sky, POLITICO (Jan. 28,
2015, 11:48 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/rand-paul-id-have-
shot-that-drone-out-of-the-sky-114679 [https://perma.cc/TCJ3-RHV3].
9 The FAA’s enforcement actions to date demonstrate that it is overwhelmed.
As of July 2016, and going back several years, the FAA has only fined a total of
twenty-four people or companies for illegal drone flights. Jason Koebler, The FAA
Gave Us a List of Every Drone Pilot Who Has Ever Been Fined, MOTHERBOARD (June 1,
2016, 1:20 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/faa-drone-fines [https://
perma.cc/E82K-6KGW]. As opposed to the millions of drones sold, the FAA only
has about 1,500 enforcement personnel, most of whom are dedicated to commer-
cial aircraft maintenance inspections. Mike Colin, FAA Executive Announces Modi-
fied Approach To Enforcement, JDA J. (May 11, 2012), http://jdasolutions.aero/
blog/faa-executive-announces-modified-approach-to-enforcement/ [https://
perma.cc/4Q4Y-VBHL].
10 See infra Part III.B.4.
11 Operations and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed.
Reg. 42,064, 42,066 (June 28, 2016) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 21); see infra Part
II.C.
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cording to standards for model aircraft.12 The standards for
model aircraft were voluntary and used guidelines created for
hobbyists in 1981.13 Contained within an FAA “advisory circular”
(AC), the guidelines asked operators not to fly higher than 400
feet above the ground and, if flying within three miles of an air-
port, to notify that airport or control tower.14 In 2007, the FAA
clarified that those operating a drone under the hobbyist guide-
lines could not do so for any commercial purpose.15 In 2012,
Congress passed a law forbidding the FAA from regulating any
aircraft being operated like model aircraft.16 By virtue of that
law, as long as drones were being flown in accordance with the
AC guidelines, the FAA could not regulate them.17 In 2015, the
FAA said that it could require aircraft certifications for UASs but
in its “discretion” chose not to.18 Its discretion changed less than
two months later, when the FAA published an interim final rule
requiring all drones to be federally registered.19 However, that
requirement was short-lived. In May 2017, a federal appellate
court struck down the registration requirement for drones oper-
ated as model aircraft.20 But from 1981 to 2015, the voluntary
guidelines on how to operate model aircraft remained stagnant.
In September 2015, the FAA released AC No. 91-57A, but it did
12 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR NO.
107-2, SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 3-1 (2016), http://www.faa.gov/docu-
mentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_107-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6JQ-
JFZW].
13 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR NO. 91-57,
MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS (1981), http://www.faa.gov/documen-
tLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/91-57.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6FN-JVHG].
14 Id.
15 Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed.
Reg. 6689, 6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
16 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336, 126
Stat. 11, 77 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)).
17 Id. § 336(2).
18 Clarification of the Applicability of Aircraft Registration Requirements for
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Request for Information Regarding Elec-
tronic Registration for UAS, 80 Fed. Reg. 63,912, 69,914 (Oct. 22, 2015) (codified
at 14 C.F.R. ch. I) (“Historically, the FAA, through the exercise of its discretion,
has not enforced the statutory requirements for aircraft registration in 49 U.S.C.
§ 44101 for model aircraft.”).
19 Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80
Fed. Reg. 78,593, 78,638 (Dec. 16, 2015) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 48.1).
20 Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“In short, Section
336 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act prohibits the FAA from promul-
gating ‘any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft.’ The Registration Rule
is a rule regarding model aircraft. Therefore, the Registration Rule is unlawful to
the extent that it applies to model aircraft.”).
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not do much to change the voluntary rules for most UAS
operators.21
2. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
Despite the growing number of drones and high-profile inci-
dents, neither the FAA nor Congress meaningfully acted to reg-
ulate them until 2012, when Congress passed the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA).22 But FMRA
did not do much to create law on its own; instead, the law gave
the FAA definitions to use and parameters by which to regulate.
FMRA created classes of UASs. The sUASs were defined as those
weighing less than fifty-five pounds.23 Heavier drones were cate-
gorized more broadly as UASs.24
For sUASs, Congress charged the FAA with making a “final
rule on small unmanned aircraft systems that will allow for civil
operation of such systems in the national airspace system.”25 For
other UASs, Congress directed the FAA to develop a “compre-
hensive plan to safely accelerate the integration of civil un-
manned aircraft systems into the national airspace system.”26
While the FAA was working on its sUAS rules and its compre-
hensive integration plan, Congress also, within Section 333 of
FMRA, instructed the FAA to determine if certain UASs could
be safely operated.27 Eventually, the FAA would use Section 333
to allow applications for exemptions from the prohibition on
operating drones outside of the AC’s guidelines or for business
purposes.28 As of September 28, 2016, the FAA had issued 5,551
individual exemptions.29 UASs can now be operated either
21 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR NO. 91-
57A, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS (2015), http://www.faa.gov/docu-
mentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_91-57A.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MM2V-EPWR].
22 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 331 126
Stat. 11, 77 (2012) (codified in part at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq.).
23 Id. § 331(6).
24 See id. § 331(9).
25 Id. § 332(b), 126 Stat. at 74.
26 Id. § 332(a), 126 Stat. at 73.
27 Id. § 333, 126 Stat. at 75.
28 Fed. Aviation Admin., § 333, https://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_basics/
section_333/ [https://perma.cc/5U3A-ME46].
29 Id.
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under this Section 333 exemption or under the new Part 107
regulations.30
3. sUAS Part 107 Regulations
Part 107 is the FAA’s newest framework for regulating all
other sUASs not operated by government agencies or under a
Section 333 exemption.31 Following much delay, and a notice of
proposed rulemaking issued back in February 2015,32 the final
Part 107 regulations within Title 14 were finally published in
June 2016 and went into effect on August 29, 2016.33 The regu-
lations can be summarized as requiring civil operators to earn a
new specialized remote pilot certificate; operate only in good
weather conditions and certain distances away from clouds; not
operate at night; remain clear of airports and their airspace;
maintain visual line of sight with the drone; not fly directly over
persons; and remain within 400 feet above ground level or
within a 400-foot radius of a structure.34 However, because navi-
gable airspace, at its lowest point, begins at least 500 feet above
ground, these regulations marked the first time the FAA had
exclusively regulated in the non-navigable airspace.35 Moreover,
as already mentioned, many states grew weary of waiting for the
FAA to regulate UASs and issued their own rules regarding
drones.36 Some even restricted where drones can fly in the same
non-navigable or low-lying airspace.37 Because these laws are reg-
ulating literally in the same space, many see these sets of laws on
a collision course.
C. THE FAA’S ATTITUDE ON LOW-ALTITUDE PREEMPTION
The FAA’s position on the issue of states regulating drones in
non-navigable airspace is not entirely clear. On one hand, the
FAA’s regulations specifically avoided including a preemption
30 See id.; see also Fact Sheet – Small Unmanned Aircraft Regulations (Part 107), FED.
AVIATION ADMIN. (June 21, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_
story.cfm?newsId=20516 [https://perma.cc/D5PT-Q4RE].
31 14 C.F.R. § 107.1 (2016).
32 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9544 (Feb. 23, 2015) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 21 et seq.).
33 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra
note 11 (issuing a new Part 107 to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
34 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 107 (2016).
35 See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2016).
36 See infra Part III.B.4.
37 Id.
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clause.38 On the other hand, its regulations suggested that some
laws may be preempted on a case-by-case basis.39 Moreover, FAA
officials have made statements that suggest implied preemption,
such as, “FAA regulations . . . apply to . . . [drones, which] have
extended the national airspace down to the ground.”40
Also puzzling was a memorandum released in December 2015
by the FAA’s Office of Chief Counsel entitled “State and Local
Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Fact Sheet,” in
which the office attempted to explain the federal framework of
aviation regulation.41 Although the memorandum did not spe-
cifically say airspace-related UAS restrictions were preempted,
instead stating, “Federal courts strictly scrutinize state and local
regulation of overflight,” it quoted case law that recommended
field preemption, and suggesting that states consult with the
FAA about such laws.42 Many saw it as a warning to states to not
try to regulate where UASs can fly.43 Curious too was the memo-
randum’s oscillation between quoting authorities that seemed to
38 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 42,194.
39 Id. (“The FAA is not persuaded that including a preemption provision in the
final rule is warranted at this time. Preemption issues involving small UAS neces-
sitate a case-specific analysis that is not appropriate in a rule of general
applicability.”).
40 Gregory S. McNeal, The Federal Government Thinks Your Backyard is National
Airspace and Toys Are Subject to FAA Regulations, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2014, 12:47 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/11/18/the-federal-govern-
ment-thinks-your-backyard-is-national-airspace-and-toys-are-subject-to-faa-regula-
tions/#be42b8a5c022 [https://perma.cc/G9UZ-K77L] (quoting Jim Williams,
the head of the FAA’s UAS Integration Office); see also Huerta v. Haughwout, No.
3:16-CV-358 (JAM), 2016 WL 3919799, at *4 (D. Conn. July 18, 2016) (“It appears
from oral argument as well as from the FAA’s website that the FAA believes it has
regulatory sovereignty over every cubic inch of outdoor air in the United States
(or at least over any airborne objects therein). If so, that ambition may be diffi-
cult to reconcile with the terms of the FAA’s statute that refers to ‘navigable air-
space’ . . .”).
41 OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STATE AND LOCAL REGULA-
TION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET (2015) [hereinafter
REGULATION OF UAS FACT SHEET 2015], http://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/
uas_regulations_policy/media/uas_fact_sheet_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N6JA-54N7].
42 Id. at 3.
43 E.g., Andrew S. Fraker & Thomas E. Williams, Drones - Division Between Federal
and State Law and What it Means to You, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 17, 2016), http://
www.natlawreview.com/article/drones-division-between-federal-and-state-law-
and-what-it-means-to-you [https://perma.cc/T6A5-NC9L] (“According to the
FAA, . . . no state or local government may attempt to regulate the operation or
flight of aircraft, including drones.”).
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support preemption specifically in the navigable airspace, and
ones that applied to all airspace.44
It is entirely possible that the FAA itself has not yet taken an
official stance on the issue. Perhaps it is waiting to see how
courts rule or whether it will be necessary to take a firm stance.
However, at the very least, the FAA, in its memorandum and
elsewhere, has succumb to relying on provisions of the U.S.
Code that are not actually the law. And as a result, it is quite
possible that the FAA has autonomously expanded its authority
beyond Congress’s specific grants under the Commerce Clause.
Regardless, these misunderstandings, spurred both by errone-
ous U.S. Code provisions and overlooked statutory limitations,
ought to be corrected. When the correct authorities are ana-
lyzed in concert with their legislative intent and historical con-
text, it becomes evident that states are not preempted from
restricting UASs in their low-lying nonnavigable airspace.
III. THE LAW?
To support the FAA’s first foray into regulating only within
the non-navigable airspace, and to claim that state laws are pre-
empted, proponents primarily point to 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1),
excerpted below.45 And seemingly, at first glance, the text in the
U.S. Code appears to offer support for the proposition that the
FAA can regulate all airspace. But a thorough look will reveal
that is not the case. Combined with statutory grants of authority
limited to only navigable airspace, a strong history of past and
present state laws in low-lying airspace, and even legislative dis-
cussions that show that federal laws were written to avoid over-
riding state laws, it will become evident that the FAA regulations
do not preempt state UAS laws. But first, to dispel the notion
that § 40103(a)(1) has bearing on this analysis, a deep dive is
taken into the statutory history of the law.
A. THE FEDERAL STATUTES ON AVIATION
1. “Exclusive Sovereignty”?
49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) states: “The United States Govern-
ment has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United
States.”46 This sentence may be regarded as the root of most mis-
44 See REGULATION OF UAS FACT SHEET 2015, supra note 41, at 6.
45 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012).
46 Id.
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understandings in analyzing airspace law and the reach of the
FAA’s authority. The primary problem being that, despite this
sentence’s prominence in case citations, it is not the law. As will
be shown below, this sentence was substantially changed by
codifiers of the U.S. Code in an apparent effort to simplify com-
plex phrasing within the original federal statute.47 That substan-
tial change culled vital words and context, and consequently,
not only changed the ostensible meaning of the provision, but
also further masked its true purpose and intent. When courts
have reviewed other laws similarly changed from statute to code,
they have overwhelmingly held that the source statute—and the
intent of Congress—is the law. This provision of law must then
be interpreted in its original and unadulterated form, as it was
passed in the Federal Aviation Act of 195848 (1958 Act) and as it
evolved, nearly verbatim, from the Civil Aeronautics Act of
193849 (1938 Act) and the Air Commerce Act of 192650 (1926
Act) before it. All three Acts’ similar provisions on sovereignty,
coupled with their legislative history and context, unmistakably
show that the version within the U.S. Code today is not a faithful
recasting of the law. Thus, as will be explained below, 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103(a)(1) has nothing to do with federal control of air-
space. Instead, the sole purpose of the provision was to assert
national sovereignty of airspace against foreign aircraft, not
against the several states.
a. Origins of the Language: From Statute to Code
Since manned flight began, there have been three major fed-
eral statutes that allowed the federal government to regulate
some aspects of airspace and aircraft. The first was the 1926 Act.
Next, the 1926 Act was amended, but not entirely supplanted, by
the 1938 Act. And finally, the current system is based on the
1958 Act. The 1958 Act replaced the 1938 and 1926 Acts in their
entirety and was codified and enacted into positive law in
1994.51 The version currently found in the U.S. Code still mir-
47 “United States of America” was changed to “United States Government” and
“exclusive national sovereignty” was changed to “exclusive sovereignty.” Compare
49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012), with Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-726, § 1108(a), 72 Stat. 731, 798.
48 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
49 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973.
50 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568, 572.
51 Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40101 et. seq.).
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rors the language of the provision as it was codified in 1994.52
Although there have been various amendments to the 1958 Act,
none have changed the provision regarding sovereignty. And
because only minor changes to that provision were made in the
1938 and 1958 Acts, the intent and meaning of the provision on
sovereignty may be traced back to its origin in the 1926 Act.53
For ease and clarity of comparison, the evolution of this provi-
sion is presented next.
The provision from the U.S. Code, as currently found at 49
U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1), states the following: “(a) Sovereignty and
Public Right of Transit.—(1) The United States Government
has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.”54
The same provision in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 stated:
Foreign Aircraft Sec. 1108. (a) The United States of America is
hereby declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive
national sovereignty in the airspace of the United States, includ-
ing the airspace above all inland waters and the airspace above
those portions of the adjacent marginal high seas, bays, and
lakes, over which by international law or treaty or convention the
United States exercises national jurisdiction.55
After only comparing the two citations, and without historical
context, it already seems quite doubtful that Congress intended
to assert complete and exclusive preemption of all airspace.
Rather, it appears likely that Congress was asserting that the
United States—as a nation—can regulate or exclude foreign air-
craft, even when they are over certain types of water. Nowhere in
52 Compare id., with 49 U.S.C.S. § 40103(a)(1) (2012).
53 E.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“The evolution of
these statutory provisions supplies further evidence [of what] Congress intended
. . . .”); Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 716 F.2d 1298, 1303 (10th Cir. 1983)
(“In determining legislative intent it is necessary to consider the legislation in its
historical context and not as if it was passed today.”); Israel-British Bank
(London) Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir. 1976) (“We
may consider the history of the phrase as it finally evolved, with particular refer-
ence to the language used in earlier statutes. We may also search for the policy
intended to be enacted. As Justice Cardozo wrote: ‘(The words) came into the
statute . . . freighted with the meaning imparted to them by the mischief to be
remedied.’” (quoting Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216,
220–21 (1936))); In re Shaver, 140 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1944) (“[W]here the
law on a particular subject is revised and rewritten, all provisions of the old law
which are retained in the new act are regarded as having been continuously in
force and as not having been repealed.”).
54 § 40103(a)(1).
55 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1108, 72 Stat. 731,
798.
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the 1958 statute did it say the “United States Government.”56
Moreover, the original section title of “Foreign Aircraft” from
the 1958 statute was deleted and replaced by an awkward com-
bined title, “Sovereignty and Public Right of Transit.”57
When one examines the 1926 and 1938 Acts, on which the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was, and the current U.S. Code
provision is, based, it becomes exceedingly clear that Congress
used this section to declare sovereignty only internationally; it
did not intend to trample on the sovereignty of states’ airspace
rights.
As stated above, each of the three major aviation acts either
replaced or directly amended the previous one. Although small
changes were made to the phrasing of the provision, the intent
never changed from when sovereignty against foreign aircraft
was first declared in the original law from 1926:
Sec. 6. Foreign Aircraft.—(a) The Congress hereby declares that
the Government of the United States has, to the exclusion of all
foreign nations, complete sovereignty of the airspace over the
lands and waters of the United States, including the Canal Zone.
Aircraft a part of the armed forces of any foreign nation shall not
be navigated in the United States, including the Canal Zone, ex-
cept in accordance with an authorization granted by the Secre-
tary of State.58
Subsequently, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 amended the
1926 Act to state:
(i) The Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended, is further
amended—
. . .
(3) By striking out the first sentence of section 6 and inserting in
lieu thereof the following: “The United States of America is
hereby declared to possess and exercise complete and exclusive
national sovereignty in the air space above the United States, in-
cluding the air space above all inland waters and the air space
above those portions of the adjacent marginal high seas, bays,
and lakes, over which by international law or treaty or convention
the United States exercises national jurisdiction.”59
56 Id.
57 Compare § 40103(a)(1), with § 1108, 72 Stat. at 798.
58 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, Ch. 344 § 6, 44 Stat. 568, 572
(at one point codified in 49 U.S.C. § 176 (1938)).
59 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, Ch. 601, tit. XI,
§ 1107(i)(3), 52 Stat. 973, 1028 (1938).
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The 1938 Act was eventually replaced by the 1958 Act, but with
respect to this provision, the text of the 1938 Act remained, al-
most exactly, as the relevant text in the 1958 Act (with the small
exception of “airspace of the United States” in lieu of “air space
above the United States”).60
b. International Intent and Origins
The reason the U.S. Congress thrice put such similar lan-
guage about international sovereignty in a domestic law was be-
cause that principle signaled what type of sovereignty the United
States asserted against foreign countries: complete and
exclusive.
While today it is clear that a nation controls its own airspace,
before World War I there was a debate as to whether the air
could be regulated at all or if airspace was subject to a free right
of flight, similar to the right to travel on the high seas.61 Three
main approaches to sovereignty were debated: the first ap-
proach claimed that all air was free and that anyone could travel
through the air; the second claimed that nations had sover-
eignty over their airspace, but that it was “subject to a right or
servitude of innocent passage”; and the third approach held
that a nation had “absolute state sovereignty” over its airspace.62
After World War I and the devastation caused by weaponized
aircraft, the international community realized that absolute sov-
ereignty was required and galvanized around that third
approach.63
60 Compare id., with § 1108(a), 72 Stat. at 798.
61 E.g., AM. BAR ASS’N., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF
AVIATION 6, 22 (1921) (“[T]he development of peace time international air law
was long retarded by a conflict of views among jurists . . . , but the view which has
definitely prevailed is that of territorial sovereignty over the air. The guiding
principles of an International Air Navigation Convention . . . included the recog-
nition of sovereignty over the air above territories and territorial waters . . . .”);
George Gleason Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 271, 273–75
(1921) (comparing international approaches to sovereignty).
62 E.g., Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. REV.
631, 639–40 n.19 (1928) (outlining and citing several sources for the three main
approaches to a nation’s sovereignty over airspace); see also HENRY G. HOTCHKISS,
A TREATISE ON AVIATION LAW 5–6 (1928); GEORGE W. LUPTON, JR., CIVIL AVIATION
LAW 2–4 (1935) (outlining the various doctrines on sovereignty and stating abso-
lute sovereignty was the approach adopted by the 1919 Paris Convention).
63 HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at 6 (“[B]y the end of the war it was perfectly
clear that all the countries . . . had agreed that the nation had sovereignty over its
airspace.”).
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Absolute, or complete and exclusive, sovereignty over airspace
was widely adopted in the first major international treaty regard-
ing air travel: The International Convention Relating to the Reg-
ulation of Aerial Navigation, sometimes known as the Paris
Convention of 1919. In article 1, the treaty stated: “The High
Contracting Parties recogni[z]e that every Power has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory.”64
That same principle, and even that same phrase “complete and
exclusive,” was the one Congress used to describe the United
States’ sovereignty in both the 1938 and 1958 Acts.65
The United States played a vital role in shaping the Paris Con-
vention and was even a signatory, but because of the Conven-
tion’s association with the League of Nations, the U.S. Senate
did not vote on it, and consequently the United States never
ratified that treaty.66 Of course, without ratification, the sover-
eignty provision in the 1919 Paris Convention would not be in-
corporated into our laws and the United States would have no
statement as to what type of sovereignty it asserted.67 At a time
when other nations ratified that 1919 Convention or made
other unilateral statements of sovereignty over airspace in their
laws,68 the 1926 Act was the method through which Congress
and the United States gave international notice that it claimed
absolute sovereignty from foreign aircraft and states over its
airspace.69
64 Int’l Convention Relating to the Reg. of Aerial Navigation art. 1, Oct. 15,
1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173.
65 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1108, 72 Stat. 731, 798;
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, Ch. 601, § 1107(i)(3), 52 Stat.
973, 1028 (1938); Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, Ch. 344, § 6, 44
Stat. 568, 572 (The 1926 act used a similar term “to the exclusion of all foreign
nations, complete sovereignty.).
66 W. JEFFERSON DAVIS, AERONAUTICAL LAW 23 (1930) (“The principle argu-
ment heard against it is the same argument that was heard in 1919: That the
Convention is connected with the League of Nations. This argument is based on
the fact that a provision is made for the League to have present a delegate at all
meetings of the Permanent Commission which administers the work of the Inter-
national Convention on Air Navigation.”).
67 See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
68 E.g., ROBERT WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 106 (1968) (citing and explain-
ing Great Britain’s Air Navigation Act of 1920). In some countries, the 1919
treaty was automatically incorporated into their national laws. Others, like Great
Britain, passed laws to give effect to the treaty. Id.
69 HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at 10–11 (“But although the United States has no
rights of flight guaranteed by treaty over other countries, it had definitely erected
barriers of exclusion to foreign aircraft in this country. It has been pointed out
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The wording of the provision changed slightly from 1926 to
1938. Instead of the phrasing in the 1926 Act, “to the exclusion
of all foreign nations, complete sovereignty,”70 the 1938 Act
amended the provision to read, “complete and exclusive na-
tional sovereignty.”71 This may also be explained by interna-
tional context. In 1931, the United States finally ratified the
1928 Pan American Convention on Commercial Aviation, some-
times referred to as the Habana Convention, which it signed in
1928.72 The Habana Convention and its principle on sovereignty
was, at the time the 1938 act was passed, the only “multilateral
convention dealing with public international air law [that the
United States had] ratified.”73
It appears evident that the technical rewording of the 1938
Act was meant to fall more in line with the 1928 Habana Con-
vention.74 Article 1 of the 1928 Habana Convention, using much
of the same language from the 1919 Paris Convention, stated:
“The High Contracting Parties recognize that every state has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory
and territorial waters.”75 This matched almost exactly the way
the sovereignty provision was minimally rephrased in the 1938
Act: “The United States of America is hereby declared to possess
that Article 6 of the Air Commerce Act proclaims the sovereignty of the United
States over the airspaces above its territory.”).
70 Ch. 344, § 6, 44 Stat. at 572.
71 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, Ch. 601, § 1107(i)(3), 52
Stat. 973, 1028 (1938).
72 Commercial Aviation: Convention Between the United States of America
and Other American Republics, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1901, T.S. No. 840 [here-
inafter Commercial Aviation Convention].
73 Hearing on H.R. 5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 75th Cong. 256 (1937) (statement of Denis Mulligan, Solicitor’s Office,
Department of Commerce); see Van Vechten Veeder, The Legal Relation Between
Aviation and Admiralty, 2 AIR L. REV. 29, 29 (1931) (“By the express terms of the
[1919 Paris and 1928 Habana Conventions], ‘every power has complete and ex-
clusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and territorial waters.’ Al-
though the United States has not ratified either convention, it has expressly
adopted the principle of national sovereignty in the Act of Congress known as the
Air Commerce Act of 1926.”).
74 See HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at 11 (“The general policy of the United States
is indicated in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and in the Havana Convention
which is the proposed code for the Americas in matters of aviation. It is to be
expected that this or some similar code will be adopted in time by the United
States . . . .”).
75 Commercial Aviation Convention, supra note 72, art. 1 (emphasis added to
ease comparison).
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and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air
space above the United States.”76
Moreover, the 1926 Act only described the areas over which
the United States had sovereignty as “lands and waters of the
United States.”77 The 1938 Act amended that language, adding
“all inland waters and . . . the adjacent marginal high seas, bays,
and lakes, over which by international law or treaty or conven-
tion the United States exercises national jurisdiction.”78 This too
has a simple explanation. At the time these laws were passed,
there were disputes in international law as to what type of waters
would be considered territory and how far into those water’s
boundaries a nation’s sovereignty would extend.79 It was not un-
til the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea that those
disputes would be mostly resolved.80 The additional language
added by the 1938 Act clarified the areas over which the United
States asserted its declared type of sovereignty. Obviously, if the
sovereignty provision was meant for a domestic audience, such
as the several states, there would be no need to cross-reference
international treaties or define sovereignty over types of waters.
Later, the Chicago Convention of 1944 would also retain simi-
lar language regarding sovereignty: “The contracting States rec-
ognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory.”81 Many other international
76 Ch. 601, § 1107(i)(3), 52 Stat. at 1028 (emphasis added to ease
comparison).
77 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, ch. 344, § 6, 44 Stat. 568,
572.
78 Ch. 601, § 1107(i)(3), 52 Stat. at 1028.
79 Commercial Aviation Convention, supra note 72, art. 1, reprinted in WILLIAM
M. MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND
AGREEMENTS 1910–1923, at 3773 (1923) (Because of these disputes, the 1919
Paris Convention included specific language about territorial waters; Article 1
continued to say, “For the purpose of the present Convention the territory of a
State shall be understood as including the national territory, both that of the
Mother Country and of the colonies, and the territorial waters adjacent
thereto.”).
80 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397,
21 I.L.M. 1261.
81 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180
[hereinafter Chicago Convention]; The Chicago Convention, the common name
for the International Civil Aviation Convention, superseded the Paris and Ha-
bana Conventions. ROWLAND W. FIXEL, LAW OF AVIATION 43 (4th ed., 1967). The
language in the Chicago Convention on waters in article 2 stated: “For the pur-
poses of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land
areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty,
protection or mandate of such State.” Chicago Convention, supra note 81, art. 2,
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agreements and individual nations would also use similar
language.82
Thus, all three versions of the domestic statutes’ provisions on
sovereignty were statements of national rights and sovereignty
meant for a foreign audience. The provision derived from the
1919 Paris Convention in response to a then-unsettled debate
about how airspace would be protected from other nations. The
provision was not meant in any way to affect the several states, or
assert federal control or preemption of airspace. It was only
meant to assert the United States’ sovereignty against foreign
nations and foreign aircraft.83
c. Legislative History
After textual and contextual examination, the aim of the sov-
ereignty provision appears clear. But if there was still any linger-
ing hesitation as to the intent and purpose of this provision, a
review of its legislative history ought to remove all doubt. To
begin, a House report regarding the 1926 Act expressly con-
61 Stat. at 1181; Comm. on Aeronautical Law of the Am. Bar Ass’n, Current Status
of Aviation Law—American Bar Association Committee Report, 14 J. AIR L. & COM. 217,
217 (1947) (“Settled principles of international law now give each Nation abso-
lute sovereignty over the airspace above the territory under their jurisdiction.
The very first article of Chapter I of the Chicago International Aviation Conven-
tion restates this principle. This means, for example, that Russia, Yugoslavia, En-
gland or the United States may exclude all foreign aircraft or these Nations may
prescribe the terms and conditions under which foreign aircraft may land on
their territory, or fly over such territory, for any purpose.”).
82 E.g., 2 U.S. SENATE COMM. COMMERCE, 89TH CONG., AIR LAWS AND TREATIES
OF THE WORLD 2545 (Comm. Print 1965) (citing the U.S.S.R. Air Code of 1961,
which in article 1 stated: “The complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air-
space of the U.S.S.R. shall belong to the U.S.S.R. Airspace of the U.S.S.R. shall be
deemed to be the airspace above the land and water territory of the U.S.S.R.
including the space above the territorial waters as determined by the laws of the
U.S.S.R. and by international treaties concluded by the U.S.S.R.”); 1 U.S. SENATE
COMM. ON COMMERCE, 89TH CONG., AIR LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD 631
(Comm. Print 1965) (citing Egyptian Decree—Law No. 57 Concerning Air Navi-
gation, May 23, 1935: “The State shall exercise complete and exclusive sover-
eignty over the airspace above its territory. The term ‘airspace’ shall include the
adjacent territorial waters.”).
83 See 2 U.S. SENATE COMM. COMMERCE, supra note 82; see also HOTCHKISS, supra
note 62, at 84 (stating the provision on sovereignty in the 1926 Act “accords with
the provisions of the International Convention for the Regulation of Air Naviga-
tion (to which the United States is not a party but in the framing of which its
representatives were active).”); Rodger F. Williams, Federal Legislation Concerning
Civil Aeronautics, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 801 (1928) (“The statement is but the
declaration of an established rule, and is not the creation by Congress of a princi-
ple applicable to its jurisdiction alone.).
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firms the first international origins and aims of the provision:
“The declarations of the sovereignty of the United States as
against foreign nations in the air space above the United States
is based upon a similar declaration found in the International
Air Navigation Convention.”84
Additionally, a compilation of the history of the bill by the
Senate Office of the Legislative Counsel further shows, in sev-
eral different documents, that the provision originated from the
1919 Paris Convention and in no way intended to abridge the
sovereignty of states:
Article 1 of the International Air Navigation Convention provides
that “the high contracting parties recognize that every power has
complete and exclusive sovereignty of the air space above its ter-
ritory.” In this section the Congress declares that the United
States adheres to the same principle and not to the principle
urged by some international jurists that there is a free right of
flight in the air space above a nation regardless of the consent or
the restrictions by law of that nation.
The section in nowise affects the apportionment of sovereignty as
between the several States and the United States, but only as be-
tween the United States and the rest of the world. In so far as the
States had sovereignty in air space at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution and such sovereignty was not by that instrument
delegated to the Federal Government, and in so far as the States
may have subsequently acquired sovereignty in air space in accor-
dance with the Constitution, such sovereignty remains
unchanged.85
Congressional testimony from expert William MacCracken—
who helped draft the 1926 Act and would later be appointed the
first head of the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Com-
84 H.R. REP. NO. 69-572, at 10 (1926).
85 OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, U.S. SENATE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926, at 38 (1928) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT] (excerpting the appendix to H.R. REP. NO. 69-572,
which was not included with some versions of H.R. REP. NO. 69-572 as referenced
in note 84); see also Bureau of Civil Air Navigation in the Department of Commerce:
Hearings on H.R. 10255 Before H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 68th
Cong. 67 (1924) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 10522] (appending statement of
Mr. MacCracken before the First National Air Institute at Detroit, Michigan, on
October 11, 1922: “This [1919 Paris Convention] declaration of principle applies
only to international law and is not controlling as between the several States and
the Federal Government . . . . This being true, the control of the air space over
the United States is vested in the respective States, except insofar as the Federal
Government may exercise control over it under the powers delegated to it by the
States in the Constitution and amendments thereto.”).
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merce86—also affirmed the international debate as to types of
sovereignty, as well as why the United States and the interna-
tional community needed a statement on sovereignty in the first
place:
MR. DENISON. If you have already answered this question you
need not answer it again, Mr. MacCracken. I want to ask whether
or not, as a principle of international law as to national sover-
eignty between nations, in the law of nations, is it recognized that
national sovereignty extends into the air, so that if an airplane
crosses a national boundary it is considered as an infringement
of the sovereignty of the country?
MR. MACCRACKEN. Yes, that is the accepted rule of international
law at the present time. Of course, prior to the International Air
Navigation Convention that was debated, the representatives of
this country contending for national sovereignty of the air, and
some of the European countries against it. But the International
Air Navigation Convention finally went on record as recognizing
the sovereignty of the air.87
During hearings on the 1938 Act, a representative from the
Department of Commerce, who was responsible for granting
foreign aircraft permission to fly in the United States,88 gave an
excellent description of how the provision on sovereignty was
understood and applied:
A certain principle of international air law is of prime impor-
tance in this matter. It differs from the law of the sea. It is the
doctrine of sovereignty in air space, which does not allow an air
line of one country to do business in foreign territory without the
permission of the foreign government concerned.89
The legislative history of the 1958 Act is devoid of any discus-
sion as to the sovereignty provision. And because the only
changes from the 1938 Act were typographical and mostly in-
volved replacing “air space” with “airspace”—as “airspace” was
86 STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? 79 (2008) (“William MacCracken . . .
would become the most important American government official in the field of
aviation in 1926 . . . .”).
87 Hearings on H.R. 10522, supra note 85, at 62 (testimony of William Mac-
Cracken, Jr., Chairman, Comm.on the Law of Aeronautics, Am. Bar Ass’n).
88 Hearing on H.R. 5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, supra note 73, at 257 (statement of Denis Mulligan, Solicitor’s Office,
Department of Commerce) (“[T]he authority to grant authorization to foreign
aircraft to navigate in the United States is in the Secretary of Commerce, . . . the
pertinent provision of the Air Commerce Act, section 6, under which the Secre-
tary now exercises authority with regard to foreign aircraft.”).
89 Id. at 254–55.
2017] AIRSPACE OF STATES 23
used in the Chicago Convention—it appears obvious that no
change to the original intent of the provision regarding sover-
eignty was meant. This is perhaps best explained by the architect
of the 1958 Act, Senator Monroney: “By no means [are] all of
[the Act’s] provisions new . . . . Many are taken almost verbatim
from existing law . . . .”90
Contemporary reports, books, written commentaries by the
American Bar Association, and even state laws, all treated the
provision as solely an external declaration over foreign aircraft,
similar to and derived from the 1919 International Convention.
It was not until the codification errors and liberties taken with
the title of the provision, that this common understanding de-
volved into a different, erroneous, and cursory assumption.
The nearly identical language in three separate federal acts,
clear intent from the source statute in 1926, international con-
ventions, and common and contextual understandings all point
to one inescapable conclusion: the provision on sovereignty had
nothing to do with domestic law or sovereignty of the federal
laws over the state laws. In fact, as will be explained in Part
III.B.3, many states not only made laws regulating aviation and
airspace both before and after the 1926 and 1938 Acts, but a
number of them also declared sovereignty over the airspace
within their own state. They likely would not have done so if the
provision on sovereignty was understood as amounting to exclu-
sive federal control of all airspace.
Perhaps today the provision would not be mistaken if it was
still phrased as it was in the 1926 Act: “to the exclusion of all
foreign nations, complete sovereignty.”91 The language from the
1958 Act, “complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the
airspace,” may be best taught as just another way of saying “sov-
90 85 CONG. REC. 13,649 (July 14, 1958); see 85 CONG. REC. 16,887 (Aug. 11,
1958) (statement by Sen. Payne: “The original plan had been to amend the
whole Civil Aeronautics Act, section by section, but it soon became apparent that
this would be a very detailed and difficult process with much risk of error
through overlooking minute but important words and phrases. The Congress
therefore decided to approach the problem of creating a Federal Aviation
Agency by reenacting the entire statute and adding or changing practically noth-
ing except as necessary to create the agency and give it powers to deal with air
safety.”); see also C.P. Trussell, New Air Agency Voted by Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1958, at 53 (“Much of the bill calls for the re-enactment of an aviation law that
began in 1926, only bringing it up to date in language to apply more closely to
the jet-age crowding of the skies.”).
91 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, ch. 344, § 6, 44 Stat. 568,
572.
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ereign soil,” but for airspace.92 There is no doubt that a nation
has absolute, or in other words, “complete and exclusive” sover-
eignty over its soil. And this provision was similarly meant to in-
form the world that there would be no doubt as to the type of
sovereignty of airspace. For example, it should be clear that just
because a part of the United States, say a part of Oregon, is re-
garded as being “sovereign soil of the United States,” that does
not preclude nor prohibit the state of Oregon from regulating
within its own borders. To put it another way, international dec-
larations of sovereignty do not in any way affect the domestic
system of federalism and the rights of states to govern
themselves.93
But if the purpose and intent of the sovereignty provision was
external to foreign nations, and not internal to assert power
over the states, how did this provision on sovereignty become so
convoluted? To answer that question, one may look no further
than the U.S. Code.
d. Confusing the Codification of Positive Law
The U.S. Code is a sexennially published compilation of pub-
lic laws organized via subject matter by the Office of the Law
Revision Counsel (OLRC) and its predecessors in the House of
Representatives since 1926.94 Statutes enacted into positive law
are ones that are congressionally prescribed to go into a specific
section of the code, and citation to a positive law part of the
code is legal evidence of such law.95 For all other statutes, which
may pertain to many different fields of law, OLRC codifiers try
to arrange and distill their parts in the U.S. Code in a way that
92 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1108, 72 Stat. 731, 798.
93 E.g., Madeline C. Dinu, State Sovereignty in Airspace, 17 J. AIR L. & COM. 43, 49
(1950) (“Mere statements that complete and exclusive sovereignty is in the
United States, such as those embodied in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and in
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, cannot be of any genuine assistance in finding
a solution [for whether a state or the federal government has control over the
navigable airspace]. First, they must be viewed as legislative announcements by
the national government that it has and will exercise full control over these skies
in the society of nations, i.e., declarations of exclusive sovereignty vis-a-vis foreign
powers, but hardly controlling on fundamental constitutional questions such as
internal sovereignty. This distinction between internal and external sovereignty has
been accepted even by those who favor federal supremacy.”).
94 See Act of June 30, 1926, Pub. L. No. ch. 712, 44 Stat. 777, 777; Detailed Guide
to the United States Code Content and Features, OFF. OF THE L. REVISION COUNS., U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://uscode.house.gov/detailed_guide.xhtml
[https://perma.cc/MW6G-8YBQ] [hereinafter Detailed Guide to the Code].
95 1 U.S.C. § 204 (2012).
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will be easier to find and understand.96 Those OLRC-arranged
parts of the U.S. Code are referred to as non-positive law titles.97
Sometimes ORLC makes changes that are overtly acknowledged
and explained in “Historical and Revision notes.”98 However,
these notes do not always show all of their changes. In the end,
regardless of whether a mistranscription was accidental or a pur-
poseful attempt to better organize or simplify text, the same
maxim from the Supreme Court applies: “the Code cannot pre-
vail over the Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent.”99
Returning now to the provision on sovereignty of airspace,
when one traces its history through historical editions of the
U.S. Code, it becomes evident that something odd happened.
After the 1938 Act, the 1940 edition of the Code, 49 U.S.C.
§ 176 (1940), had the provision’s section titled “Foreign Air-
craft—(a) Sovereignty of airspace declared,” and the text
matched the 1938 Act’s text exactly.100 The same was true of all
subsequent editions of the U.S. Code until after the 1958 Act
passed. Thereafter, the Code’s text remained the same, but the
section received a new title from an unknown source: “Declara-
tion of national sovereignty in air space; operation of foreign
aircraft.”101 This may seem minor, but titles are important as
they can give a hurried researcher a sense of context.102 The
same title remained until 1994, and the relegation of “foreign
aircraft” to follow the semicolon made it appear either that it
was not wholly relevant or that “foreign aircraft” had nothing to
do with the subsection on sovereignty.103 Moreover, subsection
96 Detailed Guide to the Code, supra note 94.
97 Id.
98 Id. For more background on the difference between positive law and non-
positive law, see generally Positive Law Codification, OFF. OF THE L. REVISION COUNS.,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://uscode.house.gov/codification/legisla-
tion.shtml [https://perma.cc/BEW6-DZX5].
99 Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943); U.S. Nat. Bank of Ore-
gon v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993) (“Though the
appearance of a provision in the current edition of the United States Code is
‘prima facie’ evidence that the provision has the force of law, 1 U.S.C. § 204(a), it
is the Statutes at Large that provides the ‘legal evidence of laws,’. . . .”).
100 49 U.S.C. § 176 (1940).
101 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1958).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Spears, 729 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A cap-
tion cannot override a statute’s text, but it can be used to clear up ambiguities.”);
United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1028 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Although a stat-
ute’s title can inform the understanding of ambiguous text, it does not ‘limit the
plain meaning of the text.’” (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,
212 (1998))).
103 See § 1508.
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(b), within that same section title, led with “Foreign aircraft,”
likely making one think that this was the only part to which the
same title applied.104 After thirty-six years, these minor title
changes may have provided just enough confusion to lead to a
dramatic change when the text of the law was reworded and
codified into positive law.
In 1994, Congress aimed to make technical improvements to
laws relating to transportation, and through a 658-page statute,
enacted many laws then codified in Title 49—including the sov-
ereignty provision at issue here—into positive law.105 In so do-
ing, Congress renumbered and rearranged many sections.106
But Congress also made clear, in legislative history and in the
text of the codifying law itself, that it did not intend to make
substantive changes to existing laws.107 Unfortunately, the
changes made to the text of the provision on sovereignty were,
in fact, quite considerable. And afterwards, those who only
looked at the language of the provision in the Code and did not
dig any deeper were led astray by the rewording.
After the 1994 positive law codification, what had then been
§ 1508(a) was moved to § 40103.108 The title of the section was
changed, for a time, to read: “Sovereignty and use of airspace,”
and the text of the provision was changed to appear as it still
does to this day: “(a) SOVEREIGNTY AND PUBLIC RIGHT OF
TRANSIT.—(1) The United States Government has exclusive sov-
ereignty of airspace of the United States.”109 This author care-
fully examined all 152 pages of the new Part A “Air Commerce
and Safety” of Subtitle VII “Aviation Programs” in Title 49 of the
Code and could not find a section where any of the remaining
portions of the original text from the 1958 Act were inserted.110
This author concludes, after an exhaustive search, that the
words of the original statute were improperly cut from ninety-
four words to thirteen and put in a completely different context
than Congress had, since 1926, thrice affirmed. The cursory re-
104 See id.
105 Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (“An Act [t]o revise,
codify, and enact without substantive change certain general and permanent
laws, . . . [in] title 49, United States Code, ‘Transportation’, and to make other
technical improvements in the Code.” This Act completed the positive-law codifi-
cation of all of Title 49. See 1 U.S.C. § 204 (2012)).
106 See id.
107 § 1(a), 108 Stat. at 745.
108 § 1(d), 108 Stat. at 1101.
109 Id.
110 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–42303 (2012).
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wording and codification of the clause led courts and commen-
tators to conclude a meaning contrary to that which Congress
had unambiguously intended.
To support this conclusion, one can first look to a separate
part of the 1994 codifying statute. In section 6(a) of the 1994
Act, Congress said: “Sections 1–4 of this Act restate, without sub-
stantive change, laws enacted before July 1, 1993, that were re-
placed by those sections. Those sections may not be construed
as making a substantive change in the laws replaced.”111 The sec-
tion at issue, § 40103, was indeed within section 1(d) of the
act.112 Given this instruction, and the statement in section 1 of
the law indicating the same, the law itself is essentially directing
a reader to the original law and not the misstated revision in the
Code. And because the most current version of 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103 is based on the 1994 law, and that law directs readers
not to construe any change as substantive, the pre-1994 version
of the law—the 1958 Act—must control. Put simply, and almost
confoundingly, the text of the law itself instructs that in this
case, its own text is not the law.
The legislative history of the 1994 law also supports this inter-
pretation. The House and Senate reports for the bill both stated
that the bill’s purpose was to “revise, codify, and enact [the laws]
without substantive change . . . and to make other technical im-
provements in the Code.”113 Adding more support, according to
the Senate report on the 1994 codifying law, substituting
“United States Government” for “United States of America” was
a standard practice done throughout Title 49.114 Thus, it was
likely not thought that such a technical and small change would
change the meaning of any provision. Moreover, most provi-
sions in Title 49 refer to domestic transportation matters; the
fact that this one (likely overlooked) provision was meant as an
assertion of sovereignty against foreign aircraft made this partic-
ular substitution unique and unintended in its result.
i. A Question of Statutory Interpretation
Now, understanding the history of the sovereignty provision
from context, to intent, to act, to code—we must verify that we
111 § 6(a), 108 Stat. at 1378.
112 § 1(d), 108 Stat. at 1101.
113 S. REP. NO. 103-265, at 1 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 103-180, at 1 (1994).
114 S. REP. NO. 103-265, at 4 (“‘United States Government’ is substituted for
‘United States’” when referring to the Government).
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can legally interpret the current text of the code in the same way
that Congress intended. We know that non-positive law parts of
the U.S. Code that conflict with their source statute cannot pre-
vail,115 but this circumstance sets forth an unusual question:
What should happen when a positive law provision of the U.S.
Code conflicts with its source statute? After all, it was not the
OLRC compilers of the code who abridged the law unofficially,
it was Congress who took the 658 pages of law revisions, as sug-
gested by the OLRC, and enacted them into positive law. But at
the same time, Congress instructed that no substantive changes
were intended and that their codification was essentially ministe-
rial. So now, does the plain text control? And if it does, would it
follow that the OLRC, with the blessing of a duly enacted con-
gressional law, can change the meaning of a law? Thankfully,
and surprisingly, federal courts have already addressed this ques-
tion in the negative: the law is to remain substantively un-
changed from its original act.
Courts uniformly agree that in cases like this, no substantive
change should be interpreted. The Supreme Court ran into this
problem just a year after the recodification of Title 49 in Ameri-
can Airlines v. Wolens.116 The provision at issue did not involve a
dramatic rephrasing, but even so, in a footnote, the Court cited
to the 1994 law and noted that even with different phrasing,
“Congress intended the revision to make no substantive
change.”117
The Sixth Circuit in Bower v. Federal Express Corp., similarly
agreed, citing a different part of the legislative history of the
1994 Act:
As in other codification bills enacting titles of the United States
Code into positive law, this bill makes no substantive change in
the law. It is sometimes feared that mere changes in terminology
and style will result in changes in substance . . . . This fear might
have some weight if this were the usual kind of amendatory legis-
lation when it can be inferred that a change of language is in-
tended to change substance. In a codification law, however, the
courts uphold the contrary presumption: the law is intended to
remain substantively unchanged.118
115 See Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943); U.S. Nat. Bank of
Oregon v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993).
116 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
117 Id. at 223 n.1.
118 Bower v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 204–05 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 103-108, at 5 (1993)).
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The Sixth Circuit, in that same case, also highlighted several Su-
preme Court decisions: Finley v. United States,119 which said,
“[N]o changes in law or policy are to be presumed from
changes of language in the revision unless an intent to make
such changes is clearly expressed”;120 and United States v. Ry-
der,121 which held, “It will not be inferred that the legislature, in
revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their
policy, unless such intention be clearly expressed.”122
The D.C. Circuit, in a separate case dealing with the same
1994 Act, took the same view: “[I]t is well established that lan-
guage revisions in codifications will not be deemed to alter the
meaning of the original statute.”123 Many other courts across sev-
eral different circuits have also upheld this general principle.124
No case law was found to support relying on a codification revi-
sion that was different than the source statute.
In sum, from the collective wisdom of several federal courts,
the statute’s history, the recodifying statute’s instruction, the
legislative history behind the recodifying statute, common un-
derstandings that Congress’s intent controls, and simple com-
mon sense, the best solution is to ignore the current misstated
provision in the U.S. Code and go to the source-law, the original
1958 Act, as reprinted in the Statutes at Large.
With this guidance, it is crystal clear that § 40103(a)(1) was
not intended to assert federal control of all airspace against the
states; it was only meant as an expression of sovereignty against
foreign aircraft and nations. Consequently, it has no place,
should be afforded no weight of law, and should not be used in
any domestic case. Congress ought to either revise the passage
to its true form, or more practically, abolish the provision alto-
119 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
120 Id. at 555.
121 110 U.S. 729 (1884).
122 Id. at 740.
123 Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey v. Dep’t of Transp., 479 F.3d 21, 41
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
124 See, e.g., Koch Foods, Inc. v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 712 F.3d 476,
484–86 (11th Cir. 2013); Tinicum Twp., Pa. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 685 F.3d
288, 299 (3d Cir. 2012); DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir.
2011) (“[T]he changes [to Title 49] were stylistic and ‘not intend[ed] to impair
the applicability of prior judicial case law interpreting these provisions.’” (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 103–677, at 83 (1994)); Rainbow Nav., Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 783
F.2d 1072, 1076–77 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454,
467–74 (1975)); see also Norman Singer & Shambie Singer, 1A SUTHERLAND STAT-
UTORY CONSTRUCTION § 28:10 & n.1 (7th ed. 1985)).
30 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
gether, as it is already within numerous international treaties,
where its foreign purpose and scope would not be so easily
adulterated. Other provisions related to the exclusion of foreign
aircraft may still be found in 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103(c) and 41703,
which § 40103 references.125
ii. Court Confusion
In light of all this background, and especially the odd conclu-
sion that the law cannot mean what it says,126 it is understanda-
ble that courts—at least ones that do not undertake as deep a
dive as done here—would read the Code provisions and be
tricked into thinking it could only mean a certain thing. What is
surprising, however, is just how many courts have misapplied
this provision. By an overwhelming majority, most courts have
improperly relied on this provision to assert federal control or
jurisdiction of all airspace. A list of just some of the courts that
have improperly relied on the “sovereignty” sentence in 49
U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) is included in this footnote.127
Thankfully, not all courts have been confused. At one point,
before the mistranscriptions, mysterious titles, and adulterated
125 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103(c), 41703 (2012).
126 A famous critiquing phrase made famous by Justice Stewart’s in Jackson v.
Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 386 U.S. 731, 736 (1967) (Stewart, J. dissenting) (“The Court
today holds that this federal law cannot mean what it says, because this would
lead to an ‘incongruous, absurd, and unjust result.’”).
127 E.g., Vorhees v. Naper Aero Club, Inc., 272 F.3d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 2001);
San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1319 n.8 (9th Cir.
1981) (“[M]any types of aviation regulation are expressly and exclusively federal.
For example, . . . the federal government has declared it is ‘to possess and exer-
cise complete and exclusively national sovereignty in the airspace of the United
States.’”); United States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1979) (Opinion of
Kennedy, J.) (“The Congress has declared its authority over national air space by
enacting the following provision in Section 1108(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.”); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Con-
gress expressed the view that the control of aviation should rest exclusively in the
hands of the federal government. In section 1108 of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a),
it is clearly provided that . . . .”); Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. E. Haddam Inland
Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, 681 F. Supp. 2d 182, 201 (D. Conn. 2010)
(“To begin, the Court agrees that the Federal Aviation Act evidences a clear con-
gressional intent to occupy the entire field of aviation safety to the exclusion of
state law. The Federal Aviation Act declares that ‘The United States Government
has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.’”); Broadbent v. Al-
lison, 155 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523 (W.D.N.C. 2001) (“As Defendants correctly note,
Section 40103 of the Federal Aviation Act states unambiguously that ‘[t]he
United States government has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United
States.’”). The list could continue for quite a while, and there are many more
examples, but the point has been made.
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recodifications, the Supreme Court succinctly summarized the
sovereignty issue and clearly rejected the interpretation that this
provision excluded the sovereign power of the states:
The provision pertinent to sovereignty over the navigable air
space in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 was an assertion of exclu-
sive national sovereignty. The convention between the United
States and other nations respecting international civil aviation
. . . accords. The Act, however, did not expressly exclude the sov-
ereign powers of the states . . . . After the enactment of the Air
Commerce Act, more than twenty states adopted the Uniform
Aeronautics Act. It had three provisions indicating that the states
did not consider their sovereignty affected by the National Act
except to the extent that the states had ceded that sovereignty by
constitutional grant . . . . Where adopted, however, it continues
in effect . . . . These Federal Acts regulating air commerce are
bottomed on the commerce power of Congress, not on national
ownership of the navigable air space, as distinguished from sover-
eignty. . . . But the federal commerce power over navigable
streams does not prevent state action consistent with that
power.128
It is true that this case came before the 1958 Act; however, be-
cause the sovereignty provision in that act came nearly verbatim
from the acts analyzed by the Braniff court, its background and
analysis—and its conclusion—are just as applicable today. Un-
fortunately, there are few other modern courts that either note
the distinction in Braniff or otherwise properly understood the
provision.129
The Supreme Court in Braniff also keenly highlighted another
problem that has added to the confusion in this area: “Federal
Acts regulating air commerce are bottomed on the commerce
power of Congress, not on national ownership of the navigable
air space, as distinguished from sovereignty . . . .”130 Although
just excerpted above, this sentence is repeated because it under-
scores a crucial point: there is a difference between sovereignty
and ownership, and even exercising jurisdiction. These terms
128 Braniff Airways v. Neb. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S.
590, 595–97 (1954).
129 E.g., Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217, 1217
n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We note that while Congress has clearly asserted sover-
eignty as to foreign nations over the United States’ airspace, at least one Supreme
Court decision indicates that the states may retain some authority to regulate
intrastate airspace.”); Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109,
1116 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 595)).
130 Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 596.
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are often thought of as being interchangeable, but these words
are distinct and a difference obviously exists, especially here in
the international context.131 Without going into an extensive
discussion of yet another topic that invites much analysis on its
own, sovereignty is the ability to have authority, to the exclusion
of other sovereigns.132 The Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush
recognized the broad problem with the term “sovereignty”: “As
commentators have noted, ‘[s]overeignty’ is a term used in
many senses and is much abused.”133 The Court went on to dis-
tinguish two uses of the term: “When we have stated that sover-
eignty is a political question, we have referred not to sovereignty
in the general, colloquial sense, meaning the exercise of domin-
ion or power . . . but sovereignty in the narrow, legal sense of
the term, meaning a claim of right . . . .”134
Regardless, by citing this foreign sovereignty provision in do-
mestic legal matters, most courts have added to the confusion
and led others, including other courts, to improperly believe
that jurisdiction is based upon this colloquial sovereignty. But
clearly, Congress has the power to make laws affecting airspace
not because of federal ownership of the air, but because of the
Commerce Clause.135 And, as will be detailed more below, Con-
gress already limited the federal government’s ability to regulate
131 Compare Sovereignty, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), with Jurisdiction,
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“A government’s general power to exer-
cise authority over all persons and things within its territory . . . .”).
132 See Joseph H. Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARVARD L. REV.
241, 241 (1923) (“The power of a sovereign to affect the rights of persons,
whether by legislation, by executive decree, or by the judgement of a court, is
called jurisdiction . . . . The creation of a legal right is an act of the law; and the
law can act only in accordance with itself. The power of a sovereign, therefore, to
affect legal rights depends upon the law; and upon the law must be based all
sovereign jurisdiction.”); Dinu, supra note 93, at 43, 47 (“The writer has felt it
necessary to trace ‘sovereignty’ in some detail, because there are many instances
of unsound arguments being used for federal usurpation of power. This is now
being seen in the field of aviation.”).
133 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 754 (2008) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 1986)).
134 Id.
135 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, ch. 344, § 6, 44 Stat. 568
(“An Act To encourage and regulate the use of aircraft in commerce . . . .”);
Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 595–97 (“These Federal Acts regulating air commerce
are bottomed on the commerce power of Congress.”); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, STATE AND AERONAUTICAL LEGISLATION DIGEST AND UNIFORM STATE LAWS
AERONAUTICS BULLETIN NO. 18, at 3 (1936), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b2
860851?urlappend=%3Bseq=9 [https://perma.cc/FUQ9-E4WY] (“The Air Com-
merce Act of 1926 is based upon the authority of the commerce clause.”).
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airspace only to that which affected interstate commerce: the
navigable airspace. In contrast, the declaration of sovereignty
was as to all airspace, not just the navigable type. This distinction
is vital for the next section. Because sovereignty was declared
over all airspace, but federal laws regulating airspace were lim-
ited by their own terms to navigable airspace, it logically follows
that there must be another type of airspace that is recognized as
externally sovereign but not regulated by the federal govern-
ment—non-navigable airspace. In this non-navigable airspace,
states always had—and still have—their own sovereignty.
2. Non-Navigable Versus Navigable Airspace
The Supreme Court has, for decades, recognized the distinc-
tion between navigable and non-navigable airspace.136 Such rec-
ognition is necessitated by Congress’s careful verbiage and
asserted authority, originally in 1926, and continuing on in each
federal aviation act to the one in force today.137
a. Navigable Airspace in the Text of the Acts
In 1926, the Air Commerce Act defined “navigable airspace”
within § 10, separate from other all other definitions (which
were in section 9):
136 See, e.g., Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 596 (“The declaration of what consti-
tutes navigable air space is an exercise of the same source of power, the interstate
commerce clause, as that under which Congress has long declared in many acts
what constitutes navigable or non-navigable waters.”); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 263–64 (1946) (“The altitude required for that operation is not the
minimum safe altitude of flight which is the downward reach of the navigable
airspace . . . . Hence, the flights in question were not within the navigable air-
space which Congress placed within the public domain . . . . But Congress has
defined navigable airspace only in terms of one of them—the minimum safe alti-
tudes of flight.”); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989) (discussing naviga-
ble airspace); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986) (relying on the
fact that observations were made from the public navigable airspace).
137 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731 (2006) (“We have also em-
phasized, however, that the qualifier ‘navigable’ is not devoid of significance.”).
For another example of the limited use of navigable, see Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (“The term ‘naviga-
ble’ has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its au-
thority for enacting [a different act using the term ‘navigable waters,’ the Clean
Water Act of 1972].”); see also id. at 173–74 (“[W]e have reaffirmed the proposi-
tion that the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though
broad, is not unlimited . . . . We thus read the statute as written to avoid the
significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents’ inter-
pretation, and therefore reject the request for administrative deference.”).
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As used in this Act, the term “navigable airspace” means airspace
above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Sec-
retary of Commerce under section 3, and such navigable airspace
shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate and
foreign air navigation in conformity with the requirements of this
Act.138
In the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act, the term was basically the
same. “Navigable air space” was defined as “air space above the
minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations issued
under this Act.”139
The 1958 Act kept the basic definitions from the previous acts
but added take-off and landing to its definition: “ ‘Navigable air-
space’ means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight
prescribed by regulations issued under this chapter, and shall
include airspace needed to insure safety in take-off and landing
of aircraft.”140
In the 1994 recodifying act, the definition was kept the same:
“‘navigable airspace’ means airspace above the minimum alti-
tudes of flight prescribed by regulations under subparts I and III
of this part, including airspace needed to ensure safety in the
takeoff and landing of aircraft”141 The same provision still sits at
49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32).142
Each act, then, made efforts to define and distinguish naviga-
ble airspace from all airspace. Each act also referenced regula-
tions promulgated by the contemporary aviation agency to
determine the bounds of navigable airspace. That history will be
discussed more below, in Part III.A.3, but for now, it will be easi-
est to simplify that navigable airspace extends down to 1,000 feet
above cities and congested areas, and, mostly, extends down to
500 feet elsewhere, as above persons or property.143 Below those
altitudes lies non-navigable airspace—and that remainder is left
to the states.
138 Ch. 344, § 10, 44 Stat. at 574.
139 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, ch. 601, § 1(24), 52 Stat.
973, 979.
140 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1958).
141 Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745, 1100.
142 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2012).
143 14 C.F.R. §§ 1.1, 91.119(c) (2012).
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b. Legislative History Regarding Navigable Airspace
i. The 1926 Act
Legislative history from the Air Commerce Act of 1926—from
which the term “navigable airspace” originated and remained
essentially unchanged to this day—confirms there was always a
meaningful distinction between “navigable” and “non-naviga-
ble” airspace:
The declaration of what constitutes navigable air space is an exer-
cise of the same source of power, the interstate commerce clause,
as that under which Congress has long declared in many acts
what constitutes navigable or nonnavigable waters. The public
right of flight in the navigable air space owes its source to the
same constitutional basis which, under decisions of the Supreme
Court, has given rise to a public easement of navigation in the
navigable waters of the United States, regardless of the owner-
ship of the adjacent or subjacent soil.
The whole framework and, in many cases, the very language of
the bill may fairly be said to be merely the application to air
transportation of provisions of the statutes and principles of law
long established as to water transportation.144
To apply that same framework envisioned by Congress, it is
clear that the federal government never had the ability to regu-
late all waters, only navigable waters.145 Similarly, it can only be
concluded that in using the term navigable airspace, Congress
in 1926—and future Congresses that carried on that definition
in subsequent aviation statutes—never intended, or may even
have thought it possible, to assert federal control of all or low-
lying airspace. The state of federal power over navigable waters
and non-navigable waters at the time of the 1926 Act can be
144 H.R. REP. NO. 69-572, at 10 (Mar. 17, 1926) (from the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce accompanying S.41, which became the enacted
law).
145 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731 (2006) (“We have also em-
phasized, however, that the qualifier ‘navigable’ is not devoid of significance.”).
For another example of the limited use of navigable, see Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (“The term ‘naviga-
ble’ has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its au-
thority for enacting [a different act using the term ‘navigable waters,’ the Clean
Water Act of 1972].”); see also id. at 173–74 (“[W]e have reaffirmed the proposi-
tion that the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though
broad, is not unlimited . . . . We thus read the statute as written to avoid the
significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents’ inter-
pretation, and therefore reject the request for administrative deference.”).
36 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
found in preeminent cases such as The Daniel Ball146 and Leovy v.
United States.147 In Leovy, the Supreme Court rejected the view
that navigable waters included all waters, for it would “extend
the paramount jurisdiction of the United States over all the flow-
ing waters,” and the purpose of navigable water regulation was
“[to protect] commerce in its international and interstate as-
pect.”148 “[T]he term, ‘navigable waters of the United States,’
has reference to commerce of a substantial and permanent
character to be conducted thereon.”149
Just as there was a clear congressional understanding of navi-
gable and non-navigable waters, and Congress intended to keep
“the legal features of the bill [founded] in existing principles of
law,”150 this article avers that there is a clear distinction between
all airspace and navigable airspace. Congress, the federal gov-
ernment, and the FAA cannot, without authority or sufficient
nexus, regulate all airspace to the exclusion of states. And the
bedrock definitions, in place since 1926, along with common
understandings and legislative history, all support this
distinction.
Such an understanding was elucidated in the House report
that accompanied the 1926 Act. There, as an explanation to the
navigable airspace provision, it was reasoned that:
Congress could prevent from blocking off air space several hun-
dred feet above his land over which he has exercised no control
and claiming it as free from any public use for flight purposes. It
is not urged that flights should be permitted below certain alti-
tudes or in such manner as to deprive the owner of the sub-
merged land of the normal use and enjoyment of his land. But it
is submitted that Congress may provide for minimum safe alti-
tudes of flight which are analogous to harbor lines or the naviga-
ble channel of a stream . . . .151
146 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (“Those rivers must be regarded as public naviga-
ble rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable
waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, . . . when
they form . . . a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on
with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such
commerce is conducted by water.”).
147 177 U.S. 621 (1900).
148 Id. at 633.
149 Id. at 632.
150 H.R. REP. NO. 69-572, at 10 (Mar. 17, 1926).
151 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT, supra note 85, at 44–45.
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The comparison to harbor lines and channel streams, and even
the express idea that Congress could only prevent blocking of
airspace “several hundred feet above” land, all lend support to
the idea that the federal government cannot take all airspace or
exclusively regulate the non-navigable first few hundred feet of
airspace, especially to preempt states. Such was the original idea,
explanation, and intent of Congress, and it has never changed
through any subsequent federal aviation act. Its principles re-
main squarely in place today.
Another key provision born in the 1926 Act, and carried on in
every subsequent federal aviation act, was the public right of
transit: “There is hereby recognized and declared to exist in be-
half of any citizen . . . a public right of freedom of transit
through the navigable airspace.”152 This enacted right means
that people can only fly in certain types of airspace—navigable
airspace—and not all airspace.153 Recall, from Part III.A.1.a
above, that the assertion of U.S. sovereignty of airspace against
foreign aircraft was not limited to “navigable airspace,” but it
was asserted for all airspace, the “airspace of the United
States.”154 In contrast, Congress recognized that for federal au-
thority to be based on the Constitution, there needed to be a
nexus to commerce, and so the FAA’s authority and the rights
152 Taken from the 1958 Act because the 1994 recodification altered some
phrasing. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 104, 72 Stat. 731,
740. All of the right of transit provisions are excerpted here for ease of reference
and comparison. From the 1926 Act: “[S]uch navigable airspace shall be subject
to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation in conformity
with the requirements of this Act.” Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-
254, ch. 344, § 10, 44 Stat. 568, 574. The 1938 version: “There is hereby recog-
nized and declared to exist in behalf of any citizen of the United States a public
right of freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air space of
the United States.” Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, tit.1, § 3, 52
Stat. 973, 980. In the 1958 Act, the same provision remained verbatim. Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 § 104. And, in the 1994 positive law recodification, the provi-
sion was reworded and renumbered as 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(2), and read: “A
citizen of the United States has a public right of transit through the navigable
airspace.” Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, §1, 108 Stat. 745, 1101.
153 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2483 (2015) (“The Court neverthe-
less must do its best, ‘bearing in mind the “fundamental canon of statutory con-
struction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”’”); Landgraf v. USI Film Products,
511 U.S. 244, 295 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[It is a] settled rule that a
statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has opera-
tive effect.”).
154 See supra text accompanying note 55, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.
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granted for public transit were limited to areas where Congress
had authority: the navigable airspace.155 Other powers not dele-
gated to the federal government—such as the police power to
regulate non-navigable low-lying airspace that is not typically
used for interstate commerce—should be constitutionally “re-
served to the States.”156
But the navigable and non-navigable reaches of federal power
are not simply a matter of a purposeful congressional choice.
The reasons for this distinction are just as vital and just as per-
suasive for the idea that states have control of low-lying, non-
navigable, and what courts used to call superadjacent airspace.
When Congress was debating the 1926 Act, states had already
stepped in to legislate minimum altitudes of flight.157 There was
a real concern by some prominent legal minds that the federal
government could not regulate, and thereby take, airspace with-
out a constitutional amendment.158 The solution settled upon
was to create an easement through the public right of transit,
which the House report on the 1926 Act said was to be:
superior to the right of the owner of the subjacent land to use
such air space for conflicting purpose. The public right of free-
dom of navigation is analogous to the easement of public right of
navigation over the navigable waters of the United States. The
primary source of power to impose such an easement is the com-
merce clause.159
. . . .
Similarly, the committee is of the opinion that the Federal Gov-
ernment may assert under the commerce clause and other con-
stitutional powers a public right of navigation in the navigable air
space, regardless of the ownership of the land below and regard-
155 E.g., BANNER, supra note 86, at 151 (“[T]he basic axiom of American consti-
tutional law [is] that the federal government possessed only whatever powers
were granted to it in the Constitution.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he Federal Govern-
ment as a whole, possesses only delegated powers. The purpose of the
Constitution was not only to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of
hand.”).
156 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
157 See infra text accompanying notes 247–58.
158 E.g., BANNER, supra note 86, at 97 (“[There was a] worry that any legislative
incursion on the landowner’s right to his airspace would be unconstitutional. If
the airspace was the landowner’s property, there was a plausible argument that a
statute taking that property away from the landowner required compensation.”);
id. at 99 (“A statute abrogating the cujus est solum maxim, by allowing aviators to
fly over private land, ran a considerable risk of being held unconstitutional.”).
159 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT, supra note 85, at 42–43.
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less of any question as to the ownership of the air or air space
itself. The only pertinent decision in this country on this point
hold that flight in the navigable air space does not constitute a
trespass; they are, however, merely two unreported lower court
cases in Minnesota and Pennsylvania.160
The two cited unreported state cases, read and considered by
the House committee, turned on this distinction of navigable
versus non-navigable airspace.161 They were Commonwealth v.
Nevin162 and Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Company.163 The
Pennsylvania case held that in passing a trespass law in 1905, less
than two years after the age of manned flight began, the legisla-
ture could not have intended that trespass apply to the air, nor
would it have expected that required printed notices would be
visible from aloft; the court found the defendants not guilty.164
A year later, the Minnesota court was the first to expressly reject
the endless application of the cujus est solum maxim, calling it “a
legal fiction, devoid of substantial merit.”165 Minnesota already
had a law prohibiting flights at less than 2,000 feet above ground
level over large cities, and the judge ruled that as long as aircraft
remained that high, no trespass would occur.166 The Congress
was then informed that trespass would not be a legal issue as
long as aircraft remained in the upper air and not in the non-
navigable airspace. Thus, Congress likely intended both this nav-
igable distinction, and the use of an easement via the public
right of transit, to ensure that so long as aircraft remained at a
certain height, property rights were not taken or trampled on.167
160 Id. at 45.
161 Reprinted or discussed in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT,
supra note 85, at 100–04; see also WRIGHT, supra note 68, at 117–18; BANNER, supra
note 86, at 120–25.
162 2 Pa. D. & C. 241 (Jefferson County, Pa. 1922).
163 128 U.S. Av. Rep. 44 (Ramsey County, Minn. 1923).
164 Id.; 2 Pa. D. & C. 241 (Jefferson County, Pa. 1922); see Reprinted or dis-
cussed in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT, supra note 85, at
100–04; see also WRIGHT, supra note 68, at 117–18; BANNER, supra note 86, at
120–25.
165 E.g., BANNER, supra note 86, at 123. This would likely set the stage for the
Supreme Court’s similar rejection of the maxim several years later in United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946).
166 BANNER, supra note 86, at 123.
167 See, e.g., Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008) (“We
have said that ‘when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an ex-
isting statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indi-
cates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial interpretations as
well.’”).
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In the years after the 1926 Act and the two court cases on
which the Act’s authors relied, many more courts would support
the notion that at a high enough altitude, in the navigable air-
space, there were no legal concerns over the primacy of federal
rights but that the privilege did not extend to the low-lying non-
navigable airspace.168 Even the 1934 Restatement (First) Torts
maintained this vital distinction.169 With this set of affirming ju-
risprudence, Congress continued the right of transit in the navi-
gable airspace—and even the careful distinction of regulating
only in the navigable airspace—in both the 1938 Act and the
1958 Act which would replace it.
ii. The 1958 Act
The legislative history of the 1958 Act also squarely supports
limiting the FAA’s authority to the navigable airspace.170 To be-
gin, when the author of the 1958 Act, Senator Monroney, first
introduced his bill, S. 3880, there were numerous references to
airspace generally that could have led one to infer that the FAA
administrator had authority to regulate and control all air-
space.171 The executive director of the National Association of
State Aviation Officials (NASAO) voiced his concern over such a
168 E.g., Strother v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 211 P.2d 624, 631 (Cal. App. 1949)
(“We concede that the United States has sovereignty over the higher airspace
within its domain . . . . But that sovereignty of the air does not authorize the
federal government, in the guise of police powers, to interfere with the lower
airspace over a private owner’s property, the use of which is intrastate and which
is necessary and beneficial to the reasonable enjoyment of his land.”); Burnham
v. Beverly Airways, 42 N.E.2d 575, 578–80 (Mass. 1942); Smith v. New England
Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 389 (Mass. 1930) (“It is essential to the safety of sover-
eign States that they possess jurisdiction to control the air space above their terri-
tories.”); Erickson v. King, 15 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Minn. 1944); Gardner v.
Allegheny Cty., 114 A.2d 491, 497 (Pa. 1955) (“The [federal aviation] Act, how-
ever, did not expressly exclude the sovereign powers of the states.”); id. at 500 (“Defend-
ants, as well as the Federal Agencies, admit that interstate flights while cruising or
in course of flight below 1,000 feet over congested areas, or 500 feet over other
than congested areas, may be enjoined by a State Court.”); Maitland v. Twin City
Aviation Corp., 37 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Wis. 1949).
169 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 194 (1934) (“An entry . . . in the air space
in the possession of another, by a person who is traveling in an aircraft, is privi-
leged if the flight is conducted . . . (c) at such a height as not to interfere unrea-
sonably with the possessor’s enjoyment of the surface of the earth and the air
space above it, and (d) in conformity with such regulations of the State and fed-
eral aeronautical authorities as are in force in the particular State.”).
170 The 1938 Act kept the definition essentially the same as the 1926 Act, so its
legislative history is not discussed here.
171 Federal Aviation Agency Act: Hearings on S. 3880 Before the S. Subcomm. on Avia-
tion of the S. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong. 136–37 (1958)
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broad interpretation during the first hearings on the bill. He
specifically recommended to insert the term “navigable” in front
of airspace so as to continue the common understandings,
saying:
These sections, taken together, appear to authorize and direct
the new Administrator to control and regulate the use of the air-
space from the surface to infinity, regardless of the purpose for
which it is used.
This we feel to be:
(a) Unnecessary, because it would go far beyond the lower limits
of airspace normally required for the safe operation of aircraft,
and the normal use of airspace by property owners;
(b) Unwise, because it would rule out in the future many of the
valuable contributions made by the States and their communities
in such activities as airport development, and local safety regula-
tions; and
(c) Might be considered both as a taking of private property
without compensation, and a direct invasion of States rights.172
NASAO’s warnings were heeded. Senator Monroney’s first
version of the bill gave the administrator powers to control “the
use of airspace of the United States”; however, in the final ver-
sion of the act, that section was kept almost verbatim—except
that “navigable” was inserted to modify airspace, and thus mod-
ify the administrator’s powers.173 Similarly, the first version of
the bill “authorized and directed” the administrator to “formu-
late policy with respect to the use of airspace” and to “assign by
rule, regulation, or order the use of airspace.”174 By the time the
1958 Act was passed, this provision likewise remained nearly ver-
batim—except that again “navigable” modified airspace in each
instance.175
Also, after the hearings, and after the final version of the bill
was entered into the record in the Senate, Senator Wallace Ben-
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 3880] (statement of A.B. McMullen, Executive Direc-
tor, National Association of State Aviation Officials).
172 Id. at 136.
173 Compare Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 3 (excerpting the original
version of the bill, S. 3880, in § 4, not using “navigable” to modify airspace), with
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 103, 72 Stat. 731, 740 (using
the term “navigable” to modify airspace in the same provision).
174 Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 9 (excerpting the original version of
the bill, S. 3880, in § 15(14), which did not use “navigable” to modify airspace).
175 § 307(a), 72 Stat. at 749 (using the term “navigable” to modify airspace in
the same “Use of Airspace” provision).
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nett of Utah offered a statement supporting the bill. In that
statement, he offered key guidance for those reading what
would become the 1958 act:
I hope the proposed law is not interpreted by some to mean that
the safety of aeronautics and the efficient utilization of airspace
requires preemption by the Federal Government of any and all
airspace which might be designated by the Administrator as “nav-
igable airspace.” It is conceivable that all airspace could be desig-
nated as suitable for the navigation of aircraft, and I urge that the
Administrator’s power of designation be limited by specific provi-
sions of the act so that State and local governments might retain
control over vast areas of airspace which, I am sure, are not
needed to effectuate the purposes of the act.176
Perhaps the most telling indication of the intent of the 1958
act can be found in an exchange during hearings on the bill
between the president of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Associa-
tion and the principal architect of the act, Senator Monroney.177
In response to a call for stricter language to support federal pre-
emption, Senator Monroney elucidated why the act could not
have such an assertion, and why it was vital to have the distinc-
tion of navigable airspace:
Senator Monroney. There is a very grave constitutional problem
that we have to consider in this, because the Federal Govern-
ment’s right to regulate airspace would be only for the purpose
of interstate commerce. We have no other right to regulate it.
Therefore, I think if we would include intrastate flying, or intra-
state operations as spelled out specifically in the bill, we might
have the whole thing ruled unconstitutional.
As for the decisions affecting the ownership of airspace, above a
person’s property —how high does a person’s property line go—
is still very much “in the air” so far as the finality of decisions is
concerned. The worst thing I think that we could do in this bill
would be to go off in the wild blue yonder of speculation as to
what the courts may finally hold after many, many cases are
heard. With the coming of the jet age you are going to have
more and more of these cases.
176 85 CONG. REC. 16887 (1958) (floor statement of Senator Bennett).
177 E.g., Robert Peele, The Senator Behind the Window Sticker, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/automobiles/04MONRONEY
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/DY3Q-PBZN] (“[Senator Monroney] was instru-
mental in the creation of the Federal Aviation Administration, an achievement
honored in the naming of the F.A.A.’s Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in
Oklahoma City.”).
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So the reason that the navigable airspace limitation, the inter-
state limitations, the reemphasis of air commerce is in the bill, is
that we have tried to bring the bill into line with well-defined and
well-established precedents as to the powers of the Federal Gov-
ernment and the Congress to regulate these things under the
commerce clause.
So we have a very difficult constitutional problem not only in the
courts, but we also have more constitutional lawyers per square
inch in the distinguished body of which I happen to be a
member.178
It appears from this exchange that Senator Monroney was him-
self skeptical of the constitutional reaches of the commerce
clause and purposefully kept the bill “into line with well-defined
and well-established precedents as to the powers of the Federal
Government.”179 Limiting the government’s authority to “navi-
gable” airspace was thus purposeful as to avoid any implication
of states’ rights. The intent of the act’s author, key congressional
supporters, and even industry concerns all overwhelmingly
point to a clear intent to avoid federal regulation of at least
some airspace—nonnavigable airspace. In all of the act’s legisla-
tive history there is scant support for any opposite notion or
argument.
Even more support for the notion that non-navigable airspace
was not meant to be regulated by the federal government can be
found in a statutory change within the 1958 Act that marked a
shift from previous statutes and definitions. The 1958 Act
slightly expanded the 1926 and 1938 Acts’ definitions of “naviga-
ble airspace” to include “airspace needed to insure safety in
take-off and landing of aircraft,” a definition that, apart from a
few stylistic changes, remains to this day.180 The reason for the
insertion of this language was not explicitly identified in the leg-
islative history of the 1958 Act, but the repeated discussion of
one federal case in particular strongly suggests the reason.181 Al-
178 Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 333–34 (testimony of Joseph B. Har-
tranft, Jr., President, Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association).
179 Id. at 333.
180 49 U.S.C. § 40102(32) (2012) (“‘[N]avigable airspace’ means airspace
above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations under this sub-
part and subpart III of this part, including airspace needed to ensure safety in the
takeoff and landing of aircraft.”).
181 The case of Allegheny Airlines v. Vill. of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y.
1955), aff’d, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956) was significantly discussed at the hear-
ings by two speakers. Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 139 (statement of
A.B. McMullen, Executive Director, National Association of State Aviation Offi-
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legheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst was examined by several
speakers during hearings on the 1958 Act.182 That case held that
navigable airspace included airspace necessary for take-off and
landing, and therefore localities could not prohibit flight within
navigable airspace because it was federally preempted. The case,
and the federal preemption analysis, hinged on whether the lo-
cality was trying to prohibit flight in navigable or non-navigable
airspace. The insertion of the take-off and landing language
within the 1958 Act’s definition of navigable airspace was thus
likely meant to ensure that the holding, affirmed by the Second
Circuit,183 would apply nationwide and that states and cities
could not prohibit flight around airports—in navigable air-
space.184 Because the core issue was whether airspace below
1,000 feet above the city could be federally regulated,185 and be-
cials); Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 54 (statement of E. Thomas
Burnard, Executive Director, Airport Operators Council).
182 Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 139 (statement of A.B. McMullen,
Executive Director, National Association of State Aviation Officials); id. at 54
(statement of E. Thomas Burnard, Executive Director, Airport Operators Coun-
cil); id. at 332 (statement of Joseph B. Hartranft, Jr., President, Aircraft Owners &
Pilots Association). All of these speakers discussed Allegheny Airlines, 238 F.2d 812.
183 Allegheny Airlines, 238 F.2d at 814 (“The appellants do not dispute that the
federal government has preempted the field of regulation and control of the
flight of aircraft in the air space 1,000 feet or more above the ground. The dis-
pute relates to lower reaches of air space which are necessary for take-offs from
and landings at airports.”).
184 Compare another widely discussed case in the hearings, United States v.
Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151 (D. Nev. 1944), and Senator Monroney’s statement en-
suring that the language in the 1938 Act language on which the Drumm court
relied to find that safety of all aircraft required federal certification of all pilots
was repeated in the 1958 Act “because there is a settled case decision on that.”
Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 334 (testimony of Joseph B. Hartranft, Jr.,
President, Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association). The only other case as fre-
quently discussed was Cedarhurst, and thus there is a strong likelihood that ex-
panding that definition of navigable airspace was done because there was also “a
settled case decision on that.” The lack of further discussion in the legislative
history of the 1958 Act suggests that such an understanding was uncontroversial.
See, e.g., Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008)
(“We have said that ‘when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an
existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indi-
cates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial interpretations as
well.’” (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71,
85 (2006))).
185 Allegheny Airlines, 132 F. Supp. at 881 (“The defendants also contend that
Congress, by the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, recognized that the airspace of not less than 1,000 feet over congested ar-
eas was navigable airspace and that the airspace under 1,000 feet was not naviga-
ble airspace and was not regulated by Congress.”).
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cause it was only found to be preempted as an extension of the
navigable airspace pursuant to the commerce power, that hold-
ing implicitly concluded the same as Senator Monroney: the fed-
eral government could not regulate non-navigable airspace.
With such a holding and enactment comes the implicit logical
corollary: had the airspace been non-navigable, a state or local
law banning overflight within that non-navigable airspace would
not have been federally preempted.
All told, the legislative history of the 1958 Act only points to
two conclusions: (1) there is a vital distinction between naviga-
ble and non-navigable airspace; and (2) the federal government
cannot regulate non-navigable airspact and preempt or overrule
states. If there was no limit to how low the FAA could regulate,
then the term “navigable” to describe airspace would be unnec-
essary. However, it was specifically inserted into the final version
of the 1958 Act to prevent federal overreach. The legislative his-
tory of the 1958 Act showed a stated intent to carry on with the
constitutional and statutory limits so clearly stated in the legisla-
tive history of the 1926 Act. Even contemporary commentators
noted that the 1958 Act tried to maintain much of the status quo
from the 1926 and 1938 Acts and purposefully avoided answer-
ing the extent to which the federal government could supplant
states’ rights.186
c. National Airspace System: Unrelated to Navigable Airspace
While at least the first sixty years of federal aviation acts and
amendments were consistent in using the defined term “naviga-
ble airspace,” only recently has another confusing term per-
vaded amendments to our federal aviation law: the “national
airspace system” or “NAS.” Remarkably, even though that term
186 WRIGHT, supra note 68, at 116 (“The end result [of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958] is that except for its establishment of a right of transit through navigable
airspace, Congress never really got into the space ownership argument, appar-
ently choosing quite appropriately to view that as a local property matter to be
determined by state law.); see id. at 116–17 (“The sum total of federal and state
statutory law, then, is that congressional enactments (a) have asserted national
sovereignty and control over navigable airspace, with (b) a corresponding free
right of passage by aircraft through such space, but (c) without making any defin-
itive statement on ownership of nonnavigable airspace. . . .”); see also 85 CONG.
REC. 13,649 (July 14, 1958); 85 CONG. REC. 16,887 (Aug. 11, 1958) (statement by
Senator Payne stating that apart from creating the FAA, the 1958 Act changed
practically nothing from the prior acts); Trussell, supra note 90, at 53.
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is used repeatedly in the two recent federal laws,187 and is found
within sixteen different sections of the U.S. Code, it is not de-
fined by statute.188
Curiously, the term is also used in fourteen different sections
of federal regulations; however, it is only defined once, within
Title 32, which deals with national security regulations:
National Airspace System (NAS). The NAS consists of the overall
environment for the safe operation of aircraft that are subject to
the FAA’s jurisdiction. It includes: air navigation facilities, equip-
ment and services, airports or landing areas; aeronautical charts,
information and services; rules, regulations and procedures,
technical information, and manpower and material. Included
are system components used by the DoD.189
Even more curiously, a similar definition, not from source law
but from a 2015 Presidential Memorandum, is included in the
annotated notes to the U.S. Code.190 The presidential definition
mirrors the C.F.R. regulation above, nearly exactly, except that
the President’s definition adds “the common network of U.S.
airspace.”191
187 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat.
11 (using “national airspace system” forty-one times but using “navigable air-
space” once in § 413); FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, Pub L.
No. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (using the term fifteen times but not using “navigable
airspace” at all).
188 The term first appeared in federal statutes in 1986 when Congress desig-
nated July 6, 1986, as “National Air Traffic Control Day.” Act of July 3, 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-355, 100 Stat. 758 (1986). The closest semblance to an existing statutory
definition appears in 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(4)(F) where the term is used, defin-
ing an air navigation facility to include buildings and systems dedicated to the
“national airspace system.” In a 2000 law, Congress, in findings related to “na-
tional airspace redesign,” referred to the “national airspace” as “comprising more
than 29 million square miles, handling more than 55,000 flights per day.” Wen-
dell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L.
No. 106-181, title VIII, § 736, 114 Stat. 171 (2000) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103). Such a definition would objectively lead one to presume that the term
is then referring to navigable airspace-related subjects.
189 32 C.F.R. § 245.5 (2016).
190 See accompanying notes to 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012).
191 Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80
Fed. Reg. at 9357 (“(c) ‘National Airspace System’ means the common network
of U.S. airspace; air navigation facilities, equipment, and services; airports or
landing areas; aeronautical charts, information, and services; related rules, regu-
lations, and procedures; technical information; and manpower and material. In-
cluded in this definition are system components shared jointly by the
Departments of Defense, Transportation, and Homeland Security.”); see also FED.
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The term’s origins could not be definitively traced, but it
seemingly originated from the FAA itself. Apart from the defini-
tion found in the federal regulation, no clear or stable defini-
tion was found to indicate what Congress’s intentions were when
using it.192 Without statutory language to indicate otherwise,
what may seem like a more encompassing term for airspace is
not. There was no conferral of authority by Congress and no
sufficient nexus to commerce declared with respect to this term.
Therefore, one can only conclude that “national airspace sys-
tem” only amasses different preexisting authorities within one
overarching and more recently popular term. It should then be
viewed as a descriptive term for the system overseen by the FAA,
which any person uses when they arrive at an airport or board a
commercial flight.193 Despite the term’s recent popularity, it
does not confer new authorities. At its broadest interpretation,
when used in the context of airspace, “national airspace system”
is, at most, another term for “navigable airspace.”
3. The Bounds of Navigable Airspace: Minimum Safe Altitudes
When Congress debated the 1926 Act—apart from wanting to
stay within the bounds of the Commerce Clause—it was weary of
igniting a debate about property owners’ airspace, trespass,194
AVIATION ADMIN., Pilot/Controller Glossary PCG N–1 (2016), http://www.faa.gov/
air_traffic/publications/media/pcg.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB8R-CDUQ].
192 The National Airspace System Office was a subdivision within the FAA as
early as 1966. See OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZA-
TION MANUAL 418, 626 (1966). And, in 1982, the term was used widely—without
reference to airspace—by a congressional office. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, U.S. CONGRESS, AIRPORT AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM 25 (1982),
https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1982/8202/8202.PDF [https://
perma.cc/4JL9-XWQ8].
193 Accord National Airspace System Overview, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://
www.faa.gov/air_traffic/nas/nynjphl_redesign/documentation/feis/media/Ap-
pendix_A-National_Airspace_System_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DUA-
JJY8] (“The NAS is made up of a network of air navigation facilities, ATC facili-
ties, airports, technology, and appropriate rules and regulations that are needed
to operate the system.”).
194 E.g., FRANCIS M. BURDICK, LAW OF TORTS 406 (4th ed., 1926) (arguing that a
flight at low altitude would be trespass, but not a flight at a great height); LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT, supra note 85, at 88 (“Learned writers
on the subject of the law of aviation have agreed that a natural easement or right
of passage should be granted to aircraft and that flight over land at such a height
as not to interfere with the use to which the land is actually put should not of
itself constitute a trespass.”).
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nuisance,195 and government takings.196 To avoid all of those
problems, Congress defined commerce through the navigability
test used in admiralty law, issued an easement for all persons
through the navigable airspace, and directed the Secretary of
Commerce to issue rules as to minimum safe altitudes of flight,
which would be, by statutory definition, the lower bounds of the
navigable airspace.197
To fulfill the statutory mandate to set “rules as to safe altitudes
of flight,” the Secretary of Commerce issued “Air Commerce
Regulations,” under the authority of Sections 3(e) and 10 of the
1926 Act.198 Every future federal aviation act continued the man-
date to have the contemporary agency set rules for the lower
bounds of navigable airspace.199 To date, each iteration of the
regulations since 1926 has always contained these minimum safe
altitudes. And, perhaps surprisingly, these regulations have not
differed significantly in the roughly ninety years they have been
in effect.
The first Air Commerce Regulations (ACRs) went into effect
at midnight on December 31, 1926.200 Within those first regula-
tions, Section 81, “Flying Rules,” Subsections (G) and (H), de-
fined the minimum altitudes of flight:
(G) Height over congested and other areas.—Exclusive of taking
off and landing, and except as otherwise permitted by section 86,
aircraft shall not be flown—
(1) Over the congested parts of cities, towns, or settlements,
except at a height sufficient to permit a reasonably safe
emergency landing, which in no case shall be less than 1,000
feet.
195 William M. Wherry & Cyril Hyde Condon, Aerial Trespass Under the Restate-
ment of Torts, 6 AIR L. REV. 113, 125 (1935).
196 E.g., BANNER, supra note 86, at 100, 166–67; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
AIR COMMERCE ACT, supra note 85, at 42–45; see also HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at
24.
197 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT, supra note 85, at 42–45, 61
(“This provision [regarding navigable airspace] does not attempt to settle to what
extent the maxim that ‘He who owns the land owns the heaves above and to the
center of the earth,’ is law.”); Air Commerce Act of 1926 § 10, 44 Stat. 568, 574.
The 1926 Congress’s own report on the matter stated it created this “public right
of flight in the navigable airspace [as] a public easement of navigation. . . .” H.R.
REP. NO. 69-572, at 33 (Mar. 17, 1926).
198 Air Commerce Act of 1926 § 3(e), 44 Stat. at 570.
199 See ch. 344, § 10, 44 Stat. at 574; Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
75-706, ch. 601, § 1(24), 53 Stat. 973, 979; 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1958).
200 ROWLAND W. FIXEL, THE LAW OF AVIATION 212 (1st ed. 1927).
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(2) Elsewhere at a height less than 500 feet, except where
indispensable to an industrial flying operation.
(H) Height over Assembly of Persons.—No flight under 1,000
feet in height shall be made over any open air assembly of per-
sons except with the consent of the Secretary of Commerce. Such
consent will be granted only for limited operations.201
Today, very similar regulations endure. Found at 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.119, “Minimum safe altitudes,” the current regulations still
afford, essentially, that aircraft remain at least 1,000 feet over
cities or persons, and above 500 feet elsewhere, except over
open water or sparsely populated areas.
§ 91.119 Minimum safe altitudes: General.
Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may op-
erate an aircraft below the following altitudes:
(a) Anywhere. An altitude allowing, if a power unit fails, an
emergency landing without undue hazard to persons or property
on the surface.
(b) Over congested areas. Over any congested area of a city,
town, or settlement, or over any open air assembly of persons, an
altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizon-
tal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft.
(c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet
above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated
areas. In those cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer than
500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.202
Thus, while some exceptions have been made to which types
of aircraft can go below the minimum safe altitudes of flight, the
baseline has always been the same: At least 500 feet, and often
1,000 feet above ground level. The statutory definition of “navi-
gable airspace” incorporated these minimum altitudes and com-
bined them with airspace needed for takeoff and landing. So lie
the bounds of the navigable airspace.
201 Id. at 239 (the referred-to section 86 allowed one to deviate from air traffic
rules in case of immediate danger, weather, or other unavoidable cause); see also,
e.g., AERONAUTICS BRANCH, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 7, at
33 (1928).
202 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (2016). The definition of “congested areas,” where 1,000
feet vertical separation is required, is determined by a case-by-case basis by the
FAA. Letter from Rebecca B. MacPherson, Office of Chief Counsel, to Leanne
Simmons (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_
offices/agc/pol_adjudication/agc200/interpretations/data/interps/2010/sim-
mons%20-%20(2010)%20legal%20interpretation.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ45-
7LXM] (stating the FAA interpreted this definition quite broadly); see also Folk v.
Sturgell, No. 08-2155 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/
Opinions/Unpublished/082155.U.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7D3-HECP].
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Figure 1: Navigable Airspace
The interrelation between minimum altitudes of flight and
the very definition of “navigable airspace” is of prominent im-
portance in analyzing states’ airspace rights. It signifies that in
granting federal regulatory authority over only some airspace—
the navigable airspace—Congress time and time again, in every
single federal aviation act, left a remainder of airspace not sub-
ject to federal control: non-navigable airspace. And apart from
immediate reaches around airports, this lower-bounds altitude
has mostly remained steady at no lower than 500 or 1,000 feet.
4. The Power of the FAA Administrator
When federal agencies make regulations, they must list their
authority for rulemaking.203 In the case of its proposed and final
sUAS regulations, the FAA listed, among others, 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103(b)(1) and (2).204 These paragraphs define the power of
the FAA administrator. The FAA quoted these two paragraphs as
granting the agency authority to regulate for “the efficient use
of airspace,” and “protecting individuals and property on the
ground.”205 But this may again be misleading because parts of
this law as they appear in the Code do not match the 1958
203 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2) (2012).
204 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9543, 9544 (Feb. 23, 2015); Operation and Certification of Small Un-
manned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,063, 42,067–68 (June 28, 2016).
205 80 Fed. Reg. at 9544 (under “Authority for this Rulemaking” section).
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Act.206 As will be shown below, this oversimplified interpretation
of the law overlooks the key congressional, and constitutional,
limitation of the administrator’s power relating to the navigable
airspace.
First, § 40103(b)(1) is presented for examination. Compare
the way the 1958 Act presented parts specifically about airspace
with the way the 1994 codification changed it. And query
whether it might mislead a reader, the FAA, or a judge to think
the FAA can make regulations regarding any airspace. This para-
graph’s 1994 deletions are “[enclosed]” in brackets and addi-
tions from 1994 are in italics:
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration [is author-
ized and directed to] shall develop plans [for] and [formulate]
policy [with respect to] for the use of the navigable airspace[;]
and assign by [rule,] regulation[,] or order the use of the [navi-
gable] airspace [under such terms, conditions, and limitations as
he may deem] necessary [in order] to [insure] ensure the safety
of aircraft and the efficient utilization of [such] airspace. [He]
The Administrator may modify or revoke such assignment when
required in the public interest.207
Again, we see within the actual law that the administrator’s
power is clearly limited to navigable airspace in every in-
stance.208 However, after reading the U.S. Code, which omitted
two references to navigable airspace but still kept one such ref-
erence, a lay observer might hastily conclude that only the FAA’s
plans and policies are for navigable airspace and that regula-
tions and orders for efficient use are applicable to all airspace.
Such a conclusion would be incorrect and disproven by the text
of the controlling 1958 Act, as well as its legislative and contex-
tual history. The administrator’s power mandate is not to ensure
“efficient utilization of airspace”; it is to ensure “efficient utiliza-
tion of such [navigable] airspace.”209 Query whether the FAA is
206 For those that have not read straight through this comprehensive article, a
discussion on why the text within parts of title 49 in the current U.S. Code is not
the law, see above, Part III.A.1.d.i, text accompanying notes 115–25.
207 Compare Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 307(a), 72 Stat.
731, 749 (1958) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1958)), and Department of
Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 6(c)(1), 80 Stat. 938 (Oct. 15, 1966)
(changing the name of the Federal Aviation Agency to the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration), with 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012).
208 See supra Part III.A.1.d.i.
209 Compare 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1) (2012) (omitting “such,” which references
“navigable”), with Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 307(a) (the original and source
law that included “such” as a direct reference to “navigable airspace”).
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aware of the true text or if it too has succumb to pernicious
reliance on the U.S. Code.
After the discussion in the preceding subsections, detailing
how each Congress passing a federal aviation act was very careful
and particular to distinguish navigable airspace, it is no wonder
that the 1958 Congress also continued this meaningful distinc-
tion and used it as a limitation on the administrator’s authority.
And because the administrator’s authority is limited to navigable
airspace—as clearly explained by Subsection (b)(1)—Subsec-
tion (b)(2) should be similarly read as only allowing air traffic
regulations either within the navigable airspace or for aircraft
that could affect the navigable airspace.
Section 40103(b)(2), on the other hand, was only changed in
the Code to rearrange words and change their tense. Because
this paragraph did not undergo significant changes to its text,
only the current U.S. Code version is presented here:
 (2) The Administrator shall prescribe air traffic regulations on
the flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes) for-
(A) navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft;
(B) protecting individuals and property on the ground;
(C) using the navigable airspace efficiently; and
(D) preventing collision between aircraft, between aircraft
and land or water vehicles, and between aircraft and air-
borne objects.210
At first blush, this provision allowing the FAA to make air traf-
fic regulations for the protection of “individuals and property on
the ground”211 may seem like a stand-alone power that could be
used as a catch-all reason to regulate, including within non-navi-
gable airspace. That is not the case. Even this federal provision
was designed to have a nexus to commerce and is dependent on
aircraft being able to enter the navigable airspace. The begin-
ning of the provision limits the authority to making “air traffic
regulations,” and it ought to be read in concert with its accom-
panying previous paragraph, § 40103(b)(1), which limits all of
the administrator’s authority to the navigable airspace.212 Taken
together and read in the context of all other sections of the
1958 Act, it ought to be clear that the authors of this provision
intended no significant change, meant to restate the law as it
210 § 40103(b)(2).
211 Id. § 40103(b)(2)(B). Originally, this was “persons and property.” Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 § 306.
212 § 40103(b)(1).
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was since 1926, and wanted to continue limiting the administra-
tor’s authority to regulate aircraft to only such aircraft capable
of entering the navigable airspace.
Legislative history confirms the intent of this provision as well
as its usual nexus to interstate commerce and navigable air-
space. The provision on protecting property and persons was
suggested by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) itself
in hearings on the 1958 Act.213 But this was again not intended
as any substantive change from the 1926 or 1938 Acts. When
asked during hearings whether the federal agency currently had
“authority to issue traffic rules for the protection of persons and
property on the ground,” the general counsel of the CAA said
that they did, but they wanted any doubt to be removed, “so that
there is not any question in anybody’s mind. And that is the sole
purpose of our amendment.”214
Aside from solidifying the federal regulatory authority to pro-
hibit “test flights and acrobatics over thickly populated areas,”215
what would become § 40103(b)(2)(B) was meant to also solidify
authority over “anything sprayed or thrown from an aircraft in
flight.”216 Around the same time that the CAA suggested adding
the provision to remove all doubt of pre-existing authority, Rep-
resentative Preston and Representative Flynt suggested a similar
amendment but for a different purpose: protecting persons
from potentially harmful aircraft crop sprays.217
But even the two representatives realized that their intent had
to have some sort of a nexus to commerce and the navigable
213 Federal Aviation Agency Act: Hearings on H.R. 12616 Before a Subcomm. of the H.
Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong. 93 (1958) [hereinafter Hear-
ings on H.R. 12616] (statement of Hon. James T. Pyle, Administrator of Civil
Aeronautics).
214 Id. at 108–09 (statement of Mr. R.P. Boyle, General Counsel, Civil Aeronau-
tics Administration).
215 85 CONG. REC. H-16081 (1958) (statement of Mr. Harris).
216 Id.
217 Hearings on H.R. 12616, supra note 213, at 267 (statement of Rep. Prince H.
Preston of Georgia); 85 CONG. REC. H-16081 (1958) (“The Administrator, in sub-
section 307(c) is authorized and directed to prescribe air traffic rules and regula-
tions for the protection of persons and property on the ground. This should
mean more than prohibiting test flights and acrobatics over thickly populated
areas. The problem of damage done by crop dusting and spraying from aircraft
was presented to the committee and considered . . . Crop dusting and spraying
are of great value and importance in certain agricultural operations but it is im-
portant that they be conducted in a safe manner. . . . This problem of adequate
protection of persons on the ground was discussed in the hearings by the distin-
guished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. PRESTON].”).
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airspace, so they reasoned that “the itinerant aircraft that oper-
ate in this area of dissemination also constitute a hazard to avia-
tion, because as we know, they are flying under [visual flight
rules (VFR)] conditions, have to, and they constitute a portion
of the hazard that is brought about by the VFR flying vis-a-vis
higher altitude flying.”218 Essentially, their argument was that
these aircraft would constitute a hazard within navigable air-
space and thus could be regulated. They also intended to ex-
tend the ability to protect persons and property to another
reach of the navigable airspace: airspace used for take-off and
landing.
[I]n addition to providing for the protection of persons and
property on the ground from possible danger from insecticides
and from crop-spraying aircraft, this would make it clear that the
Administrator has the duty and the responsibility of protecting
persons and property which are located in the glide and take-off
path of the airways, airports which are presently in existence and
which will be constructed in the future.219
Had they intended that the administrator have a wider reaching
authority, it is curious why they would relate their amendment
to creating hazards in flight and to “persons and property which
are located in the glide and take-off path of the airways. . . .”
Under either rationale brought by the representatives, or under
the CAA’s assertion that this authority already existed, there was
a direct link to an effect within the navigable airspace. Given the
strong history of states’ rights and clear limitations to the naviga-
ble airspace within the 1926 and 1938 Acts, any greater intended
authority would have surely sparked more comment and debate
in the 1958 Act’s legislative history. Instead, the topic was men-
tioned only a few times and only as either linked to the naviga-
ble airspace or simply reaffirming authority already thought to
exist. The provision should thus be interpreted according to its
legislative history and contextual limitation to navigable air-
space, either of which indicates that this provision does not ex-
pand the FAA’s authority to non-navigable airspace.
Taken together, these two provisions at § 40103(b)(1) and
(2)—provisions on which the FAA primarily relies to promul-
gate rules regarding airspace (and in this case sUASs)—show,
when read in their proper 1958 version, that the FAA has very
218 Hearings on H.R. 12616, supra note 213, at 268–69 (statement of Rep. Prince
H. Preston of Georgia).
219 Id. at 269.
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limited authority to regulate in non-navigable airspace. With
proper historical context, an understanding Congress’s intent,
and a reading of the proper version of the law, this article asserts
that the power of the FAA to regulate below navigable airspace
of at least 500 feet is very limited, as explained in Part V.
B. ROLE OF STATES IN AVIATION: PAST TO PRESENT
The debate over how much airspace, and how low, the federal
government could regulate was a fascinating and controversial
debate that started more than 100 years ago, but it was never
completely settled. Each of the federal aviation acts was written
to avoid contention on the subject.220 Some, including the au-
thor of the 1958 Act, Senator Monroney, purposefully avoided
legislating on the topic of states’ airspace rights, hoping that the
matter would simply evolve to become settled over time.221
Sadly, the topic remains unsettled today. Courts have not defini-
tively ruled on the matter, and many states are actively legislat-
ing in this area, apparently also believing the matter is not
settled.222
1. States’ Rights in the Federal Aviation Acts
Statutory limitations and legislative history are important fac-
tors in analyzing states’ airspace rights. But perhaps a more com-
pelling argument that states are allowed to regulate their own
airspace is that federal law for decades affirmed that very right.
The first federal act regarding aviation, the Air Commerce Act
of 1926,223 had a provision, in § 4, that stated: “The several
220 E.g., HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at 24 (“So far [f]ederal legislation has stu-
diously avoided any definition of rights in the air space. . . .”).
221 Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 114 (statement of A.B. McMullen,
Executive Director, National Association of State Aviation Officials) (“Senator
Monroney . . . One of the problems, of course, is on the question of airspace over
cities and towns and communities, and particularly with reference to landing. It
apparently seems to me, however, that the question has never yet been fully re-
solved by the courts as to how high up property rights extend and we have been
more or less reluctant to enter that field until such time as the courts have finally
spoken in regard to the adequate protection of property rights.
Mr. McMullen. Well, sir, that is a very difficult question.
Senator Monroney. It is a very difficult question and with all of the other difficult
questions in there, I hope we can tailor this bill to where we will not find it neces-
sary to go into something that is going to be subject to as much controversy as the
extension of property rights vertically is, without even the courts having any defi-
nite resolution of it.”).
222 See infra text accompanying notes 259–70.
223 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568.
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States may set apart and provide for the protection of necessary
airspace reservations in addition to and not in conflict with air-
space reservations established by the President under this sec-
tion or with any civil or military airway designated under the
provisions of this Act.”224
This section specifically annunciated the right of states to en-
act their own airspace reservations, so long as they did not con-
flict with airspace reservations made by the President or with any
civil or military airway.225 Both the federal and state airspace res-
ervations were applicable to both navigable airspace and non-
navigable airspace. Although the state airspace reservation pro-
vision remained unaffected after the 1938 Act,226 it was eventu-
ally omitted when the 1958 Act repealed the 1938 and 1926
Acts.227 However, the reasons for its omission did not have any-
thing to do with curtailing states’ rights, as will be explained be-
low. And assuming, arguendo, that it was purposefully removed
from the statute with an eye towards preventing states from re-
stricting flights over parts of their lands, it does not mean that
right—one that the states clearly had and asserted with their
own laws—disappeared with the provision. To put it another
way, the original provision was not a grant of authority to the
states, it was a recognition of their preexisting authority. Obvi-
ously, the failure of Congress to keep a provision as to the right
of states, or to otherwise list rights of states but not include a
certain one, does not mean that the states still do not have that
right.228 Quite the opposite. Except for a preemption analysis,
which will be discussed later, if federal law is silent on the sub-
ject then states typically retain their rights.229
2. The Omission of Section 4 Did Not Abrogate States’ Rights
The 1958 Act was passed in response to increasing mid-air col-
lisions resulting from separate air traffic control of military and
224 Id. ch. 344, § 4. Federal regulations also restated this annunciation of states’
rights. 2 Fed. Reg. 2184 (Oct. 14, 1937) (CAR 60.34).
225 Today, airspace reservations are known as prohibited or restricted airspace.
226 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973; 49 U.S.C.
§ 174 (1952).
227 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, title XIV, § 1401(a), 72
Stat. 731, 806.
228 See U.S. CONST. Amend. X.
229 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014) (“In our federal
system, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and
the people retain the remainder. The States have broad authority to enact legisla-
tion for the public good—what we have often called a ‘police power.’”).
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civilian airspace.230 These accidents, stemming from the fact that
large swaths of military airspace left little airspace for the grow-
ing civilian industry, were frequently cited in hearings as the
main reason for the 1958 Act.231 Even the summaries of the Act
by its author and principal supporters boiled down the Act’s
purpose as rectifying the struggle between civil and military air-
space: “The broad purpose of this legislation is to establish a
new Federal Aviation Agency with powers adequate to enable it
to provide for the safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace
by civil and military air operations.”232
After World War II and the increased need to safeguard the
airspace above military and other sensitive areas, the use of fed-
eral airspace reservations was widespread. As was expressed in
Senate hearings on the 1958 Act, “One of the most serious
problems confronting aviation is the increasing need for air-
space by civil and military users.”233 It was argued that the way
the military annexed airspace for its own reservations interfered
with and delayed civil aviation, and even led to mid-air
crashes.234
At that time, there was a diffusion of responsibility for military
airspace. The President had authority for military reservations,
under § 4, the Secretary of Defense had authority over military
airways, and still other airspace allocations were decided by the
Civil Aeronautics Board. The diffusion became unworkable.
Eventually, President Truman issued an executive order estab-
lishing the Air Coordinating Committee to solve airspace
230 E.g., Richard E. Mooney, New Agency on Air Safety Requested by Eisenhower:
Congress Urged to Merge Military and Civil Units Now Running Aviation’s Traffic, Re-
search and Planning, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1958, at 1; Hearings on S. 3880, supra note
171, at 303 (statement of William K. Lawton, Executive Director, National Busi-
ness Aircraft Association, Inc.) (“In the recent months past, the air carriers have
met tragedy through midair collisions involving military aircraft. The waves of
indignation that rose and swept throughout the Nation, the loud cries for imme-
diate improvement in our system of air traffic control have resulted in our meet-
ing here today.”).
231 E.g., Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 303; Text of President’s Plan for a
New Aviation Agency, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1958, at 11; C.P. Trussell, New Air Agency
Voted by Senate: Control of Civil and Military Planes Given to One Group in Bipartisan
Measure, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1958, at 53.
232 85 CONG. REC. 16083 (1958) (statement of Rep. Flynt) (emphasis added);
85 CONG. REC. 16084 (1958) (statement of Rep. Harris) (emphasis added); H.
REP. NO. 85-2360, at 1 (1958) (emphasis added).
233 Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 151 (1958) (statement of E.R.
Quesada, Chairman, Airways Modernization Board).
234 Id. at 342 (statement of A.F. Bonnalie).
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problems.235 But as the number of planes236 and reservations237
increased, the Committee became hampered by its own infight-
ing and procedural problems.238 Indeed, in the debate about
this bill, much angst was directed to the Air Coordinating Com-
mittee.239 Eventually, in 1957, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) stepped in and issued new regulatory procedures to “at-
tain the maximum effective utilization of the available air-
space,”240 asserting its jurisdiction over airspace for both civil
and military use.241
The CAB, a civilian agency, stepped in to control airspace
matters of the military and national security, which troubled
many.242 Because the authorities for airspace allocation were
vested in provisions like § 4, and because there was a question as
to whether the military could be bound by a civilian agency’s
rules, many called for a federal statute to formally consolidate
that airspace allocation and solve those “shifting sands of legal
235 Exec. Order No. 9781, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,645 (Sept. 19, 1946); S. REP. NO. 85-
1811, at 14 (1958) (“[A]ll matters involving the use of airspace were referred to
the Airspace Panel of the interagency Air Coordinating Committee, a group first
set up by Executive order in 1946, with representatives of the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Post Office, Treasury, and Commerce Departments, as well as from the
Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Communications Commission.”).
236 S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 13 (1958) (“The number of planes seeking their
share of our airspace has almost quadrupled since 1938. . . . [M]ore airspace is
required for each if proper separation is to be maintained.”).
237 Id. (“In addition, a significant amount of airspace has been ‘reserved’ or
declared ‘off limits’ to aircraft for a variety of governmental purposes.”).
238 Hearings on H.R. 12616, supra note 213, at 30 (statement of General E.R.
Quesada, Chairman, Airways Modernization Board) (“In this hodgepodge of au-
thorities, the committee method has been used to assign airspace on a case-by-
case basis resulting in long debate, serious delay, and patchwork solutions.”).
239 85 CONG. REC. 16084 (1958) (statement of Rep. Harris) (“Under this system
[with the Air Coordinating Committee], airspace has been assigned on a case-by-
case basis, often resulting in delays and patchwork solutions to many critical air-
space problems.”); Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 164 (“Senator
Monroney. One man must have the final responsibility, and to delay decision
interminably with interservice discussions, as in the Air Coordinating Committee
. . . would lead to a disagree of nullification of what the bill seeks to achieve on
the allocation of airspace.”); S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 14 (1958).
240 Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 446 (quoting Air Traffic Rule 60-9 of
the Civil Air Regulations, effective April 1, 1958).
241 Id. at 445–46 (statement of Mr. James R. Durfee, Chairman, Civilian Aero-
nautics Board). The rule 60–9 and 60.13A (noticed in proposed rulemaking on
July 28, 1957) became effective April 1, 1958, just months before the 1958 Act was
passed. “Subject only to that reservation power to the President, the Board as-
serted in this rule complete jurisdiction over the airspace.” Id.
242 S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 14 (1958).
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ambiguity.”243 But even this call for consolidation caused con-
sternation, and a debate was had over whether the singular
agency would be placed under the executive branch or whether
it should be an independent agency.244
Eventually, the singular agency, now known as the FAA, was
created under the executive branch. And, because the executive
had ultimate control of this agency, it was thought that the Presi-
dent’s statutory power over airspace in § 4 of the 1926 Act would
be redundant and unnecessary.245
Throughout the hearings for the 1958 Act, and in all of the
accompanying reports and testimony that make up the compre-
hensive legislative history, at no time was there any discussion
about states’ rights to enact airspace reservations under § 4. The
only related argument revolved around the President’s § 4 “au-
thority to make airspace reservations for national defense or
other governmental purposes.”246 It appears that Congress was
either unconcerned with continuing to enunciate states’ rights
or so focused on the President’s power under § 4 and consoli-
dating civil and military navigable airspace to promote commer-
cial flights that it did not consider the states’ powers. No
indication of an intent to repeal or prohibit states’ airspace res-
ervation rights was found in any legislative history of the 1958
Act. Even outside of federal legislation, and regardless of § 4 res-
ervation rights, states, from before the 1926 Act to well after the
1958 Act, still believed—and to this day believe—that they have
the right to make laws about their own airspace.
243 Id. (“The present legislation proposes to clear away this ambiguity once and
for all by vesting unquestionable authority for all aspects of air space manage-
ment in the Administrator of the new Agency.”).
244 Hearings on S. 3880, supra note 171, at 267 (statement of Mr. MacIntyre,
Under Secretary of the Air Force) (“The Department of Defense feels very
strongly that this new Agency must be clearly established in the executive branch
of the Government. . . . For example, section 25 of the Monroney bill would
repeal section 4 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, under which the President has
been authorized to set apart and protect airspace reservations in the United
States for national defense purposes. . . . But it is felt that serious constitutional
questions would be raised if that agency, wielding a power so fundamental to the
protection of national defense interests, were not an executive agency at least
subject to the direction and control of the President.”).
245 Id. at 164 (“Mr. Quesada . . . I think it is well to emphasize again, if I may,
the President’s authority under section 4 of the Air Commerce Act would not be
relinquished, and it must be clear to all that the allocation of airspace as a very,
very serious implication in terms of military operations.”).
246 H. REP. NO. 85-2360, at 3 (1958).
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3. Historical State Laws
State aviation laws, enacted both before and after the first fed-
eral aviation act, evince that Americans always believed states
had at least some rights to control their airspace. In 1911, Con-
necticut passed the first law regulating aviation in the United
States.247 By 1920, aviation committees were born in the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) and in the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.248 These committees ac-
tively debated whether aviation should be legislated exclusively
at the federal level or both through federal and state govern-
ments. After considering the issue, the ABA concluded, in 1921,
that without a constitutional amendment, the federal govern-
ment could not exclusively regulate airspace and air
commerce.249
Around the same time, in 1922, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the influential
“Uniform State Law for Aeronautics.”250 By 1928, ten states and
one territory had incorporated that law.251 By 1936, it had been
enacted, either partially or in whole, in twenty-one states;252 that
number rose to twenty-three by 1944.253 If the provision on sov-
ereignty in the 1926 and 1938 Acts were truly meant to forbid
states from regulating airspace, it would seem unlikely that so
many states and preeminent legal organizations would have
passed and recommended laws asserting states’ sovereignty over
their own airspace.
247 The law said “every aeronaut was held responsible for all damages.” HOTCH-
KISS, supra note 62, at 38 (citing Conn. Laws of 1911, ch. 90, § 3117).
248 Id. at 21; BANNER, supra note 86, at 125.
249 HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at 20–21, 68 (“[P]roperty rights of the land
owner in the airspace above land is so absolute that before aviation can become
possible a constitutional amendment will be necessary since until this is done
every flight involves a series of repeated trespasses amounting to a taking of prop-
erty without due process of law.”); see also BANNER, supra note 86, at 116, 118
(citing Cornell law professor George Borget of the National Conference of Com-
missions on Uniform State Laws, and also citing the legal advisor to the U.S.
Army Air Service as advocating for a necessary constitutional amendment in or-
der to regulate airspace and avoid trespass suits).
250 HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at 24; BANNER, supra note 86, at 125–26.
251 HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at 24.
252 1936 U.S. AV. R. 376 (listing all the states adopting the uniform law and
providing the citation to those laws).
253 1944 U.S. AV. R. 129. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws ceased recommending that states enact the uniform law in 1943.
Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590,
596 (1954).
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The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics did not simply denote
that states could regulate airspace; it explicitly declared state
sovereignty of airspace not assumed by the federal government:
Sec. 2. Sovereignty in Space.
Sovereignty in the space above the lands and waters of this State
is declared to rest in the State, except where granted to and as-
sumed by the United States pursuant to a constitutional grant
from the people of this State.
Sec. 3. Ownership of Space.
The ownership of the space above the lands and waters of this
state is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface
beneath, subject to the right of flight described in section 4.
Sec. 4. Lawfulness of Flight.
Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this state is lawful
unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing
use to which the land or water or the space over the land or water
is put by the owner, or unless so adopted as to be imminently
dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or water
beneath.254
As of July 2017, nineteen states still had active statutes that
expressly asserted their sovereignty of their own airspace,255 and
twenty-two states still had an assertion of airspace ownership by
surface owners as active laws, as described in Sections 2 and 3 of
the Uniform Law, respectively.256
Further support for the historical understanding that airspace
was not exclusively regulated at the federal level can be seen not
just from assertions in the laws about state sovereignty of air-
space, but also in states, and even cities, regulating minimum
altitudes of flight.257 Before the 1926 Act, six states and New
254 HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at 24.
255 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-8206; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21401; COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1-106; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 302; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263-2;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-202; IND. CODE ANN. § 8-21-4-2; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 1, § 6;
MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 5-104; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.012; MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 67-1-202; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 493.030; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:2-4; N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 63-11; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 2-03-02; TENN. CODE ANN. § 42-1-
102; UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-10-123; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 114.02; WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-4-301. Additionally, New York still has rules regarding minimum safe alti-
tudes, which appear to be modeled after contemporary federal regulations. N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW § 245 (McKinney).
256 In addition to the nineteen states listed in note 255, above, three states still
have provisions similar to Uniform Law § 3. States that have a provision on own-
ership, but repealed their sovereignty provision are: MO. ANN. STAT. § 305.020;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 50-13-3; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 402.
257 HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at 50–51.
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York City already had restrictions for minimum altitudes of
flight, and more would enact such restrictions even after the
1926 Act.258
4. Current State Laws
Apart from laws about state sovereignty of airspace recounted
above, one of the more telling observations about states’ rights
to enact laws regarding UASs is the extent to which many al-
ready have. In fact, the majority of states have enacted laws relat-
ing to UASs. As of July 2017, at least thirty-nine states had
enacted such laws. These laws can be categorized in several
ways.259 Many laws deal with law enforcement’s use of UASs.260
Other laws forbid weaponizing UASs.261 Many states are starting
to restrict local or municipal laws regarding UASs.262 Another
substantial subset restricts the use of UASs with regard to hunt-
ing and wildlife.263 States have even enacted laws to prevent in-
258 Id. (Connecticut (added after 1926), 2000 feet, Laws 1927, ch. 324; Kansas,
1000 ft. over cities and 250 ft. over premises, KANSAS REV. STAT. 1923 ch. 3-106;
Maine, 1000 ft., Laws 1923, ch. 220, Laws of 1925, ch. 189; Massachusetts, 3000 ft
over thickly settled places or business districts, 1000 ft. over open-air assemblies,
500 ft. over buildings or persons, Acts 1922, ch. 534, Acts 1925, ch. 189; Minne-
sota, “Low height,” Laws 1925, ch. 406; New Jersey, 2000 ft., Laws 1921, ch. 124;
New York City, 2000 ft. City Ordinance No. 52, July, 18, 1921).
259 UAS laws not categorized in one of the subsequent categories include: N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 54-60-28 to 54-60-29 (UAS test site program); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 201-72.6 (same); IOWA CODE § 808.15 (admissibility of evidence obtained by
unmanned aerial vehicle); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 183.086 (no reckless operations
of unmanned aircraft); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 122.98 (formation of a commit-
tee to research and develop UASs); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-8-1 (granting authority for
state regulation of UASs generally); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-303 (no landings on
another’s property).
260 ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.65.900–18.65.909, 29.10.200, 29.35.146; FLA. STAT.
§ 934.50; IDAHO CODE § 21-213; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 167/1–167/40; IND. CODE
§ 35-33-5-9; IOWA CODE §§ 321.492B, 808.15; ME. STAT. tit. 25, § 4501; MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-5-109; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15a-300.1 to 15a-300.2; N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 29-29.4-01 to 29-29.4-06; OR. REV. STAT. § 837.310; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-609; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63G-18-101 to 63G-18-105; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 4622; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1; WIS. STAT. § 175.55.
261 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 330.411; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.24; OR. REV. STAT.
§ 837.365; NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.106; UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-14-303; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 4018; WIS. STAT. § 941.292.
262 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3729; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § P.A. 17-52; § 1;
GA. CODE ANN. § 6-1-4; LA. STAT. ANN. § 2.2; MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 14-
301; OR. REV. STAT. § 837.385; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.009; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 72-14-103; VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-926.3.
263 IDAHO CODE § 36-1101; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/48-3; IND. CODE § 14-22-6-
16; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.40111c–324.40112; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207:57;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-295, 14-401.24; OR. REV. STAT. § 498.128; S.C. CODE ANN.
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terference with wild firefighting,264 police,265 and manned
aircraft.266 Several deal with restrictions on use of UASs in an
effort to protect people’s privacy.267 And finally, and most perti-
nently, a number of states already restrict where UASs can
operate.268
In that final category, restricting where UASs can operate, at
least nine states have enacted laws that are essentially low-lying
airspace restrictions.269 Those laws range from specifically in-
cluding UAS operations in the definition of criminal trespass to
protecting low-lying airspace immediately above police opera-
tions, prisons, and critical infrastructure facilities, such as power,
gas, and chemical facilities. Notably, Tennessee even uses non-
navigable airspace to define the altitudes in which UASs cannot
operate over private property.270
These laws do not just show states rightly believe they have the
authority to enact these non-navigable airspace restrictions for
UASs, but they also show the need for such state-based regula-
§50-11-2200; TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-301; W. VA. CODE § 20-2-5; WIS. STAT.
§ 29.083.
264 UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-3-2.5; CAL. PENAL CODE § 402; IND. CODE § 35-44.1-
4-10.
265 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3729; CAL. PENAL CODE § 402; IND. CODE § 35-
44.1-4-10.
266 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-280.3.
267 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-101; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8; FLA. STAT. § 934.50;
IDAHO CODE § 21-213; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-31a02; LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283; MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-29-61; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-300.1; OR. REV. STAT. § 163.700;
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-901 to 93-13-907; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§§ 423.001–423.008; WIS. STAT. § 942.10.
268 DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 1334 (no operations over events with more than 1,500
people, over incidents with first responders, or over critical infrastructures); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 330.41 (no operations over critical infrastructures); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:337 (no operations over certain facilities, including schools); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:63 (defining criminal trespass to include operating a UAS over property of
another); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:108 (no operations over a police cordon); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 493.103 (no operations under 250 feet over property when owner
notifies UAS operator); NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.109 (no operations over new criti-
cal facilities); OKLA. STAT. tit. 3, § 322 (no operations over critical infrastructure
facilities); OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380 (restrictions over property when owner noti-
fies UAS operator); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 50-15-3 (no operations over prisons or
military facilities); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-405 (criminal trespass via UAS over
private property in nonnavigable airspace); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 411.062,
411.065 (restrictions over state Capitol Complex); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 423.0046 (restrictions over sports venues); WIS. STAT. § 114.045 (no operations
over a correctional institution).
269 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
270 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-405.
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tion.271 States and localities are worried about protecting vital
utilities like water, power, and gas. Some also worry about inter-
ference with firefighting and police activities. And still more
worry about intrusions of privacy, surveillance, voyeurism, and
invasions of reasonable expectations of privacy.
Ten states specifically include a right to privacy in their consti-
tutions,272 and protecting citizens from hovering UASs that re-
cord them from outside their windows are likely the kinds of
protections that fall within this right to privacy.273 State legisla-
tures are in the unique position of being able to pass laws re-
lated to privacy. In contrast, the FAA has explicitly said “that its
mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system
in the world, and does not include regulating privacy.”274
Moreover, as a practical matter, regardless of what rights
states have over their low-lying airspace, their zoing power al-
ready provides a functional, albeit inelegant and hard-to-enforce
alternative to effectuate restrictions on where UASs can operate.
Combined with the general federal requirement to keep UASs
within an operator’s range of sight, states or municipalities can
simply prohibit the takeoff or landing of UASs within large ar-
eas.275 Rather than use this hodgepodge of a workaround, it
seems more beneficial to allow states to have more plenary con-
trol of low-lying airspace. That way states can be more targeted
and responsive to safety and security issues, while still balancing
privacy concerns and promoting businesses. Overall, for an in-
271 State courts had long ago recognized the need for states to control immedi-
ate reaches of airspace. E.g., Erickson v. King, 15 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Minn. 1944)
(“It is the proper function of the legislative department of government in the
exercise of the police power to consider the problems and risks that arise from
the use of new inventions and endeavor to adjust private rights and harmonize
conflicting interests by comprehensive statutes for the public welfare.” (quoting
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co. Inc., 170 N.E. 385, 389, 390 (Mass. 1930)).
272 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1;
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 7; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
273 See also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960)
(presenting four forms of the invasion of privacy tort: (1) intrusion upon seclu-
sion; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing facts; (3) publicity in a false light; and
(4) appropriation of one’s name or likeness).
274 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed.
Reg. 42,063, 42,190 (June 28, 2016).
275 See, e.g., Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778, 790 (6th Cir. 1996);
Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul, 912 F.2d 215, 219 (8th Cir. 1990); Casciani v.
Nesbitt, 659 F. Supp. 2d 427, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 392 F. App’x 887 (2d
Cir. 2010).
2017] AIRSPACE OF STATES 65
dustry aimed at recreational use or providing short-range deliv-
ery alternatives, it would appear wiser to regulate ubiquitous
drones closer to the way we do cars than to expensive and com-
plex aircraft.
C. CASE LAW
Germane to the right of states to enact laws about their non-
navigable airspace is how courts have historically evaluated these
rights. A brief high-level survey begins next.
1. The Supreme Court and Airspace
Any recap of case law involving airspace properly starts at the
guidestar case of United States v. Causby.276 There, a couple
outside of Greensboro, North Carolina, owned a large farm, in-
cluding several structures used to raise chickens. Their farm was
less than 2,500 feet from a nearby airport, and the glide path of
landing planes, including government-owned military aircraft,
passed directly over their property at 83 feet.277 Reasoning that
“the fact that the planes never touched the surface” was “irrele-
vant,” the Court concluded that there was a government ease-
ment in the air and thus a taking of property rights.278
Causby is often cited as ending the purported ancient doctrine
of property law, that one who owned land owned all that was
above and below it, “Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelom.” The
court held that “it has no place in the modern world,” partly
because of the general principle that “the air is a public high-
way, as Congress has declared.”279 But what is often overlooked
is that the Court only ended that maxim in the navigable air-
space; the court affirmatively retained it in the non-navigable
airspace,280 just as the Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Com-
pany case had done more than two decades earlier.281
276 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1946).
277 Id.
278 Id. at 262, 268.
279 Id. at 260–61.
280 Id. at 264 (“Hence, the flights in question were not within the navigable
airspace which Congress placed within the public domain.”); id. at 265 (“The
superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous
invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We think that the
landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of
it are in the same category as invasions of the surface.”); see also id. 265 n.11;
accord, e.g., Dinu, supra note 93, at 43, 51.
281 Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Company, 1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 218
(Ramsey County, Minn. 1923); see also supra text accompanying notes 161–67.
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Throughout the opinion, the Court relied on the distinction
between navigable and non-navigable airspace. Despite regula-
tions for minimum safe altitudes of flight regulations that in-
cluded take-off and landing,282 the Court went back to
Congress’s definition: “The Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of
course, the power to prescribe air traffic rules. But Congress has
defined navigable airspace only in terms of one of them—the
minimum safe altitudes of flight.”283 The Court even suggested
that regulations allowing too low of a minimum safe altitude
would have presented them with a “question of the validity of
the regulation.”284 One other point made by the Court warrants
highlighting: the Court acknowledged, quoted, and relied upon
North Carolina’s statutory assertion of their own state sover-
eignty over airspace to support their holding for the landowners
in “immediate reaches of the superadjacent airspace.”285
The lesson from Causby is then that reliance on the statutory
definition of navigable airspace is paramount. There is a level of
superadjacent or non-navigable airspace where, “if the land-
owner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclu-
sive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping
atmosphere.”286 State statutes asserting those rights for the states
and for landowners were also endorsed and harmonized with
the federal laws.287 Thus, the end of the ad coelum doctrine only
applied to the upper navigable airspace and not to the non-navi-
gable airspace.288
282 14 C.F.R. § 60.350 (Supp. 1941).
283 Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
284 Id. at 263.
285 Id. at 266 (also quoting with approval the North Carolina law, derived from
the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, that asserted state sovereignty). For a
discussion of that state Uniform Code, see supra text accompanying notes
250–56.
286 Causby, 328 U.S. at 264, 265 (“While the owner does not in any physical
manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional
sense, he does use it in somewhat the same sense that space left between build-
ings for the purpose of light and air is used.”).
287 Id. at 266.
288 Many contemporary commentators and courts caught this vital distinction.
E.g., John C. Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace, 15
J. AIR L. & COM. 27 (1948) (“[The Supreme] Court has divided the airspace over
the United States into two zones. In the lower zone next to the earth’s surface,
private property in the airspace is permitted and we must assume that in that
zone normal relationships exist between State and Federal sovereignty as else-
where in State territory. But in the upper zone (the navigable airspace) the rights
of the Federal Government seem to have been considered so paramount that
Congress was able to place the navigable airspace, as stated in the Court’s opin-
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2. Other Takings Cases
Many cases have held that when the government, even with
helicopters, flies below 500 feet, such flights are compensable
takings, even if they are only transitory. Such cases are presented
here, en masse, to briefly demonstrate that many courts do not
believe that the government has a right to be in what turns out
to be non-navigable airspace.289 The natural corollary to these
decisions is that if the government has created a compensable
easement in non-navigable airspace, where it does not have the
statutory easement of the public right of transit, then any private
person flying or operating in the same airspace would commit a
trespass.
3. Privacy and Airspace
The issue of navigable and nonnavigable airspace has serious
ramifications not only concerning states’ rights and federalism,
but also for privacy and government surveillance as well. Several
cases have established that so long as police surveillance is made
from “a public vantage point where [anyone has] the right to
be,”290 then police do not need a warrant—even if surveilling
from an aircraft. In California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court re-
lied on the fact that police observations from a private airplane
“took place within public navigable airspace,” to conclude the
target had no reasonable expectation of privacy.291 Later, in Dow
ion, ‘within the public domain.’”); Dinu, supra note 93, at 43, 51 (“So far as the
private property owner is concerned, the superadjacent non-navigable airspace
below safe altitudes of flight . . . has the quality of property, and as an incident to
his ownership of the land, the landowner has a claim to such non-navigable air-
space. Invasions of it are like trespass on the surface, and the rights of the private
property-owner are paramount in such non-navigable airspace.”); Andrews v.
United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 150, 155–56 n.4 (2012). Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v.
United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2005); United States v. Praylou, 208
F.2d 291, 294 (4th Cir. 1953).
289 See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny Cty., Pa, 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962); Palisades Citi-
zens Ass’n v. C. A. B., 420 F.2d 188, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. 15,909
Acres, 176 F. Supp. 447, 448 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Speir v. United States, 485 F.2d
643, 646–47 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798, 801 (Ct. Cl.
1963); A. J. Hodges Indus., Inc. v. United States, 355 F.2d 592, 597 (Ct. Cl. 1966);
Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444, 446 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Dick v. United States,
169 F. Supp. 491, 494 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F.
Supp. 597, 598 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 187, 195–96
(1995), aff’d, 106 F.3d 424 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Hsu v. County of Clark, 173 P.3d 724,
731–32 (Nev. 2007).
290 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
291 Id. at 213–14.
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Chemical Co. v. United States,292 the Court again held that taking
aerial photographs from navigable airspace was not a prohibited
search under the Fourth Amendment.293
With Ciraolo and Dow Chemical, the definition of “navigable air-
space” started to become expressly entangled with Fourth
Amendment considerations of reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy and government surveillance. Under this line of jurispru-
dence, if a drone has a legal right to hover outside of your
window, just feet above your property—as the FAA part 107 reg-
ulations allow—then not only can strangers peer into your
home, but the police can too, even without a warrant.294
Three years after Ciraolo, those same maxims were again
tested, this time against modern aviation advancements in the
form of helicopters. In Florida v. Riley,295 the government ar-
rested a defendant based on an aerial observation of drugs from
a helicopter hovering at 400 feet.296 The Supreme Court noted
that because “helicopters are not bound by the lower limits of
the navigable airspace,” the flight was not “contrary to law or
regulation,” so the Court allowed the warrantless observation.297
Justice Brennan, dissenting, found it curious that “the reach of
the Fourth Amendment can be so largely defined by administra-
tive regulations issued for purposes of flight safety.”298
Applying Riley confirms that if states are not allowed to step in
to prevent drones from operating at low altitudes, then those
operations would be legal under FAA rules and erase any rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. That would, in turn, allow the
police to operate a drone outside your window, just the same as
anyone else.
292 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
293 Id. at 239.
294 E.g., United States v. Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 843–44 (8th Cir. 2006) (up-
holding a warrantless evidence obtained by helicopter 200–300 feet above
ground).
295 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
296 Id. at 448–49.
297 Id. at 451; see, e.g., United States v. Ramo, 961 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1992);
State v. Rodal, 985 P.2d 863, 867 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding helicopter sur-
veillance when it was operated lawfully and unintrusively); Henderson v. People,
879 P.2d 383, 389–90 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (upholding helicopter surveillance
where there was no substantiation of significant wind, dust, threat of injury, or
nuisance); State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161 (N.M. 2015) (helicopter at a disputed
altitude, but so low as to cause physical damage from downwash and excessive
noise and debris made the search unreasonable).
298 Riley, 488 U.S. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Through such decisions, the FAA has been made the de facto
arbiter of reasonable expectations of privacy, despite recogni-
tion by the FAA itself that: “its mission is to provide the safest,
most efficient aerospace system in the world, and does not in-
clude regulating privacy.”299 But the problem is that if the FAA
does not factor privacy considerations into their rules, then
there is no other federal entity that can or will.300
States should therefore be allowed to pass drone laws for the
additional reason that they have a traditional responsibility to
protect the privacy of their residents. Regulating how drones are
used is one way to achieve this, but for true protection from
personal intrusions, states must also be able to regulate where
drones cannot be used.
Ultimately, despite spending significant time framing statu-
tory context, historical originals, miscodifications, specific con-
gressional grants of authority, states’ views, and case law on
airspace and takings—and how that all affects privacy—this arti-
cle’s argument hinges on one key question: Are state laws re-
garding UASs preempted by federal law or federal regulations?
IV. PREEMPTION ANALYSES OF FEDERAL
AVIATION LAWS
The Supremacy Clause in Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Con-
stitution allows Congress to “preempt” or invalidate a state law
through a federal statute.301 The congressional invalidation can
be found expressly in a statute, or if there is no express preemp-
tion language in a statute, then it can be found to have implicitly
preempted a state law or rule.302 Implicit preemption can be
found either through “conflict” preemption or “field” preemp-
tion.303 Whenever any type of preemption is found, the state law
is held to be without effect. Despite this strong power, there is a
hesitancy by courts to use it: “In all pre[ ]emption cases, . . . we
299 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, supra
note 274.
300 It should be noted that an agency within the Department of Commerce has
released voluntary UAS privacy principles, but they have no legal force or en-
forcement mechanisms. Multistakeholder Process: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, NAT’L
TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFO. ADMIN. (June 21, 2016), https://www.ntia.doc
.gov/other-publication/2016/multistakeholder-process-unmanned-aircraft-sys-
tems [https://perma.cc/7788-VZ4H].
301 E.g., Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015).
302 Id.
303 Id.
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start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”304
A. EXPRESS PREEMPTION
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 contained no mention of
preemption. Neither did the 1926 and 1938 Acts on which it was
based.305 Quite the opposite. Until 1958, the governing laws ex-
pressly allowed for state airspace regulation.306 When the 1958
Act later omitted that section, there was no indication that this
right was intended to be curtailed.307 Even the FAA Moderniza-
tion and Reform Act of 2012, which dealt with UASs, did not
contain any indicia of preemption.308 And in the most recent
2016 federal act on aviation,309 despite other versions of the bill
having a section that included a statement expressly preempting
state and local laws, Congress ultimately chose not to discuss
preemption.310
Only in one place for matters of aviation has Congress ever
written an express preemption. In the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978, Congress preempted state and local laws “relating to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier.”311 However, that was in
a provision that required a complex government certification of
304 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
305 According to the 1958 Act’s principal author Senator Monroney. 85 CONG.
REC. 13,649 (July 14, 1958); see also 85 CONG. REC. 13,649 (July 14, 1958); see 85
CONG. REC. 16,887 (Aug. 11, 1958) (statement by Sen. Payne: “The original plan
had been to amend the whole Civil Aeronautics Act, section by section, but it
soon became apparent that this would be a very detailed and difficult process
with much risk of error through overlooking minute but important words and
phrases. The Congress therefore decided to approach the problem of creating a
Federal Aviation Agency by reenacting the entire statute and adding or changing
practically nothing except as necessary to create the agency and give it powers to
deal with air safety.”); see also C.P. Trussell, New Air Agency Voted by Senate, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 1958, at 53 (“Much of the bill calls for the re-enactment of an
aviation law that began in 1926, only bringing it up to date in language to apply
more closely to the jet-age crowding of the skies.”).
306 See supra text accompanying notes 223–27.
307 See supra text accompanying notes 230–45.
308 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat.
11.
309 FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-190, 130
Stat. 615.
310 S. 2658, 114th Cong. § 2142 (2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/senate-bill/2658/text [https://perma.cc/WA5U-WGDB].
311 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 4, 92 Stat. 1705,
1708 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2012)).
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an air carrier and has no applicability to UASs. History clearly
shows that Congress knew how to indicate express preemption
generally for matters of aviation and particularly for UASs.312
But other than the inapplicable instance of the Airline Deregu-
lation Act,313 Congress has purposefully chosen not preempt
state laws regarding drones or airspace.
B. IMPLICIT PREEMPTION
1. Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption is found when “it is impossible for a pri-
vate party to comply with both state and federal requirements,
or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”314
We have already seen that the purpose of the 1958 Act was to
promote safety and integration of civil and military aircraft and
airspace. And we already know that the 1958 Act used many pro-
visions from its preceding scheme of laws, which expressly al-
lowed states to regulate airspace.315 Having found no purpose or
objective that belies states’ rights to regulate non-navigable air-
space, we turn to whether it would be possible to comply with
both state regulation of non-navigable airspace and federal reg-
ulation of all aircraft and navigable airspace. By virtue of al-
ready-enacted state laws, it is clear that it is possible to so
comply; indeed, this is already occurring.316
In addition to not making a rule regarding preemption, the
FAA has abdicated restricting how a UAS is used, stating such
laws are up to states.317 And none of the at least nine states that
have laws restricting where an sUAS can operate conflict with
312 Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009) (“Congress could have ap-
plied the pre-emption clause to the entire FDCA. It did not do so, but instead
wrote a pre[ ]emption clause that applies only to medical devices.” (quoting Rie-
gel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 327 (2008))).
313 There are other inapplicable preemption provisions in Title 49, including
49 U.S.C. § 44921 (federal flight deck officer firearm program), and 49 U.S.C.
§ 44703(j)(2) (regarding records). But those provisions do not affect aircraft or
airspace and are thus irrelevant to this discussion.
314 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Arizona v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012).
315 See supra Part III.B.
316 See supra text accompanying notes 259–70.
317 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed.
Reg. 42,063, 42,194 (June 28, 2016).
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part 107 or other federal regulations.318 The most apt analogy to
describe why state laws do not conflict with sUAS regulations
comes from an equivalent type of federal restriction: temporary
flight restrictions (TFRs). This designated area of airspace tem-
porarily restricts “certain aircraft from operating within a de-
fined area in order to protect persons or property in the air or
on the ground.”319 The FAA issues TFRs on a near-daily basis
and all pilots are required to check notices to airmen
(NOTAMs) before they fly. State laws ought to be viewed simi-
larly, simply as restrictions on where UASs can operate. Practi-
cally speaking, the state aviation agencies can simply transmit
this data to the FAA or to commercial drone vendors, and the
data can be centralized alongside other areas that are already
prohibited to all aircraft by federal laws. State UAS laws do not
permit anything that the FAA does not, and as they are more
restrictive laws—simply restricting operations in more areas—
they would only complement federal regulations, not conflict.
Congress has also realized that local restrictions on where
UASs can fly would not conflict with federal regulations. In a
recent statute, passed in July 2016, Congress directed the FAA to
establish a process where it could be petitioned to prohibit or
restrict UAS operation around critical infrastructure facilities,
amusement parks, or other warranted locations.320
2. Field Preemption
One of the leading cases on field preemption in aviation was
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc.321 There, the Su-
preme Court determined that the “pervasive nature of the
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise” meant that local
laws restricting noise and take-offs at certain times of day were
preempted.322 The Court was worried that if municipalities were
free to enact these laws, then “fractionalized control of the tim-
318 See supra text accompanying notes 259–70.
319 See Temporary Flight Restrictions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faasafety
.gov/gslac/ALC/course_content.aspx?cID=42&sID=239&preview=true [https://
perma.cc/K45Y-D3F5]; see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.139 (2016).
320 FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-190,
§ 2209, 120 Stat. 615.
321 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
322 Id. at 633. Note also that the Court relied on the erroneous versions of the
laws on external sovereignty and the administrator’s authority. Compare id. at
626–27 (citing the provision on sovereignty and the FAA administrator’s author-
ity), with supra text accompanying notes 205–19 (explaining how the provisions
referenced are not the law).
2017] AIRSPACE OF STATES 73
ing of take[-]offs and landings would severely limit the flexibility
of FAA in controlling air traffic flow” (among commercial air-
lines in the navigable airspace).323 The Court even imported a
famous line by Justice Jackson in a 1948 concurring opinion,
stating: “Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not
wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by
federal permission . . . and under an intricate system of federal
commands.”324 But both Justice Jackson and the majority in City
of Burbank were referring to a scheme of commercial aircraft
and airports all exclusively within the navigable airspace.325
Neither opinion considered preemption for non-commercial
traffic or non-navigable airspace. However, the case is still useful
as a roadmap to analyzing field preemption generally.
Congress legislated here in a field which the States have tradi-
tionally occupied. . . . So we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. . . . Such a purpose may be evidenced in several
ways. . . . Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be as-
sumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same sub-
ject. . . . Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal
law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the
same purpose.326
Taking City of Burbank’s condensed template, we may apply
the information learned in earlier parts of this article: that no
federal declaration of exclusive sovereignty against states exists;
that Congress’s easement and grant of authority to the FAA was
only to navigable airspace; that Congress purposefully legislated
airspace in a way that would avoid states’ rights implications;
that traditionally, most states asserted sovereignty and laws over
their own low-lying airspace; that states had rights to restrict air-
space, as recognized by federal law; and that courts have recog-
nized federal takings in non-navigable airspace. It can then only
323 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639.
324 Id. at 633–34 (quoting Nw. Airlines v. State of Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303
(1944) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
325 The next part of that same line reveals as much, as does the temporal con-
text and the entirety of his opinion, “[A plane] takes off only by instruction from
the control tower, it travels on prescribed beams, it may be diverted from its
intended landing, and it obeys signals and orders.” Nw. Airlines v. State of Minne-
sota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
326 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
74 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
be concluded that, at least for the non-navigable airspace, Con-
gress never intended to foreclose any state regulation in the
area. Indeed, until the FAA’s sUAS regulations, the federal gov-
ernment had never regulated exclusively in the non-navigable
airspace. Recall that Congress’s instruction to the FAA was to
integrate UASs in the national airspace system, not in newly au-
thorized airspace.327 Congress knew how to expressly grant pre-
emption, and considered doing so for sUASs, but ultimately
decided not to.328 Moreover, Congress is presumed to be aware
of the nineteen states that retained laws on aeronautics from the
Uniform Law of the early 20th century.329 And it is also pre-
sumed to know of the current state laws on drones specifi-
cally.330 Yet Congress has never expanded its grant of authority
to the FAA outside of navigable airspace, and it has never ex-
pressed a dominant interest in or purpose for a federal system
solely within the nonnavigable airspace. Even the FAA, in its
rulemaking, did not advocate a preemption clause.331 Simply
put, the federal interest in, and object sought in, an area never
before legislated upon, or regulated—and for the most part
avoided to forestall such a debate about states’ rights—is nearly
null. And it falls well short of upsetting and overruling the deli-
cate federal–state system of laws, especially in areas that have
historically been reserved to the states.
Other cases that have found field preemption would not con-
tradict this article’s analysis and conclusion because they all as-
sessed navigable airspace.332 For instance, in Abdullah v. American
327 See supra text accompanying notes 187–93, explaining how “national air-
space system” likely means “navigable airspace.”
328 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009) (“As Justice O’Connor ex-
plained in her opinion for a unanimous Court: ‘The case for federal pre-emption
is particularly weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation
of state law in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by
both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them.’” (quot-
ing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–167
(1989)).
329 See supra notes 255–56.
330 See supra notes 259–70 and accompanying text.
331 81 Fed. Reg. 42,063, 42,194 (June 28, 2016) (“The FAA is not persuaded
that including a preemption provision in the final rule is warranted at this time.
Preemption issues involving small UAS necessitate a case specific analysis that is
not appropriate in a rule of general applicability. Additionally, certain legal as-
pects concerning small UAS use may be best addressed at the State or local
level.”).
332 E.g., Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778, 786 (6th Cir.1996)
(stating “[federal] regulations preempt local law in regard to aircraft safety, the
navigable airspace, and noise control”); British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y.,
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Airlines, the Third Circuit held that federal law thoroughly occu-
pied the “legislative field” of aviation safety so as to preempt sim-
ilar state and territorial standards.333 But the issue that the
Abdullah court faced concerned a commercial airliner and pre-
emption of air safety within the “navigable airspace.”334 And, just
as this article has done, to find support for its conclusion, the
court looked at the purpose of the act, and also quoted legisla-
tive history as evidence of statutory intent.335 Moreover, many
cases that the Abdullah court cited relied on terms like “the na-
tion’s airways” and “navigable airspace.”336 In contrast, as has
been exhaustively stated already, this article avers states’ rights
to regulate non-navigable airspace.
C. PREEMPTION BY REGULATION
What has just been described was analysis of whether a federal
statute preempts state law. Similarly, when analyzing federal regu-
lations and whether they preempt state law, the inquiry is fo-
cused on the intent of the agency and whether it “prescribed the
regulations meant to pre[ ]empt [state] law . . . and, if so,
whether that action is within the scope of the [agency’s] dele-
gated authority.”337 However, in the case of the sUAS regula-
tions, the agency considered the issue but ultimately chose not
to assert regulations that would preempt state law.338 Case law
558 F.2d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he legislative history [of a 1968 act which
amended the 1958 Act] clearly states that the statute was merely intended to
strengthen the FAA’s regulatory role within the area already totally preempted
control of flights through navigable airspace.”). Similarly, in Skysign International
v. City & County of Honolulu, the Ninth Circuit—which, incidentally, also recog-
nized that § 40103 did not explicitly “exclude the sovereign powers of the
states”—went further to say that the “mere volume and complexity; of the FAA’s
regulatory scheme do not, without some affirmative accompanying indication,
compel a conclusion that the agency has sought to occupy the field to the full.”
Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2002).
333 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 364–67, 376 (3d Cir. 1999).
334 Id. at 364.
335 Id. at 368 (quoting S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 5 (1958)).
336 Id. at 370–71.
337 Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1982);
Drake v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 458 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 2006).
338 81 Fed. Reg. 42,063, 42,194 (June 28, 2016) (“The FAA is not persuaded
that including a preemption provision in the final rule is warranted at this time.
Preemption issues involving small UAS necessitate a case-specific analysis that is
not appropriate in a rule of general applicability. Additionally, certain legal as-
pects concerning small UAS use may be best addressed at the State or local
level.”); id. at 42,189 (“[T]his rule does not address preemption issues because
those issues necessitate a case-specific analysis that is not appropriate in a rule of
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teaches that in such a case, the “‘mere volume and complexity’
of the FAA’s regulatory scheme do not, without some affirmative
accompanying indication, compel a conclusion that the agency
has sought to occupy the field to the full.”339 In fact, for regula-
tory field preemption, the Supreme Court has stated:
We are even more reluctant to infer pre[ ]emption from the
comprehensiveness of regulations than from the comprehensive-
ness of statutes. As a result of their specialized functions, agen-
cies normally deal with problems in far more detail than does
Congress. To infer pre[ ]emption whenever an agency deals with
a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that
whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field, its regula-
tions will be exclusive. Such a rule, of course, would be inconsis-
tent with the federal-state balance embodied in our Supremacy
Clause jurisprudence. Moreover, because agencies normally ad-
dress problems in a detailed manner and can speak through a
variety of means, including regulations, preambles, interpretive
statements, and responses to comments, we can expect that they
will make their intentions clear if they intend for their regula-
tions to be exclusive. Thus, if an agency does not speak to the
question of pre[ ]emption, we will pause before saying that the
mere volume and complexity of its regulations indicate that the
agency did in fact intend to pre[ ]empt.340
In some cases, agencies have spoken later to assert regulatory
preemption. But should the FAA so assert in the future, it would
not be determinative either. Although federal agencies receive
deference in other types of analyses, courts do not defer “to an
agency’s conclusion that state law is pre[ ]empted. Rather [courts
attend] to an agency’s explanation of how state law affects the
regulatory scheme.”341 “The weight we accord the agency’s ex-
general applicability. The FAA notes, however, that state governments have his-
torically been able to regulate the takeoffs and landings of aircraft within their
state boundaries. The FAA anticipates that the Tribes would be able to exercise
similar internal sovereignty with regard to the takeoffs and landings of small UAS
within their territories.”).
339 Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1116–17 (9th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707,
717, 718 (1985); see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000)
(stating that the “[Supreme] Court has looked for a specific statement of pre-
emptive intent” by the agency when looking at regulatory field preemption); see
also California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987)
(“[I]t is appropriate to expect an administrative regulation to declare any inten-
tion to pre-empt state law with some specificity.”).
340 Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717–18
(1985) (internal citations omitted).
341 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–77 (2009).
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planation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme depends
on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.”342
Regardless of an agency’s assertion and explanation, courts
would also be required to look at whether the agency had dele-
gated authority to make such preemptive regulations.343 Taking
into account the history, context, and intent explored in the
parts above, courts would also look to see whether the FAA’s
sUAS regulations are within the scope of the agency’s delegated
authority. In the FAA’s notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
for sUASs, and in its final rule on sUASs, the agency listed § 333
of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 as its author-
ity for rulemaking.344 In § 333, and § 332, to which it refers,
Congress’s direction was clear, each time limiting FAA’s
rulemaking to the “national airspace system.”345 Given the un-
derstanding of the term “national airspace system” as only apply-
ing to the navigable airspace,346 and given that for ninety years
Congress has never explicitly authorized federal agencies to is-
sue regulations outside of the navigable airspace,347 no specific
delegated authority was found for the FAA to issue rules outside
of that traditional and limited authority. The other authorities
that FAA lists were similarly limited to regulating the navigable
airspace or activities that could affect the navigable airspace.348
And finally, there is simply a fundamental concern over the
FAA regulating an area that implicates property, privacy, tres-
pass, nuisance, zoning and air rights, and other traditionally
342 Id. at 577.
343 See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1982);
Drake v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 458 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 2006).
344 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9543, 9544 (Feb. 23, 2015); Operation and Certification of Small Un-
manned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,063, 42,067 (June 28, 2016).
345 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a),
126 Stat. 11, 73 (“the Secretary of Transportation, . . . shall develop a comprehen-
sive plan to safely accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems
into the national airspace system.”); id. § 332(b), 126 Stat. 11, 74 (“[T]he Secre-
tary shall publish in the Federal Register—(1) a final rule on small unmanned
aircraft systems that will allow for civil operation of such systems in the national
airspace system. . . .”); id. § 333(a), 126 Stat. 11, 75 (“[T]he Secretary of Trans-
portation shall determine if certain unmanned aircraft systems may operate safely
in the national airspace system before completion of the plan and rulemaking
required by section 332 of this Act . . . .”).
346 See supra text accompanying notes 187–93.
347 See supra text accompanying notes 203–19.
348 See supra text accompanying notes 203–19.
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state reserved powers.349 Even if the FAA were to be granted au-
thority to regulate low-lying airspace, there would lie a serious
question of the constitutional validity of such delegated author-
ity. As the Supreme Court warned in Causby, it might eventually
be called upon to answer a “question of the validity of the regu-
lation.”350 And recent history shows that the Supreme Court has
not hesitated to put limits on the expansive reaches of the Com-
merce Clause.351 At bottom, it seems that if Congress would step
in to give the FAA authority to regulate the airspace just outside
our bedroom windows, to the exclusion of the states, not only
would it present a challenge under the Commerce Clause, it
would highlight an ignominious imbalance in our federal–state
system.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FAA HAS SOME LIMITED POWER
TO REGULATE IN NON-NAVIGABLE AIRSPACE
After detailed analyses, this article concludes that states have
the right to regulate their own low-lying, non-navigable airspace.
At the same time, it must be noted that the FAA also has some
limited authority to regulate in that same space, but those pow-
ers are mostly limited to when activities or aircraft in non-naviga-
ble airspace have the potential to interfere with those in
navigable airspace.352
The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate, among
other things, “those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.”353 Indeed, a similar rationale was presented by the
1926 Congress and made the first ACRs applicable to all aircraft,
regardless of whether they were flying interstate or intrastate
349 E.g., Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81
Fed. Reg. 42,063, 42,194 (“The [FAA’s] Fact Sheet also notes that laws tradition-
ally related to State and local police power—including land use, zoning, privacy,
trespass, and law enforcement operations—generally are not subject to Federal
regulation.”).
350 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 263 (1946).
351 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
352 Accord The Air Commerce Act of 1926, 27 COL. L. REV. 989, 990 (1927) (“The
close relation of intrastate and interstate commerce would seem also to warrant
federal supervision of the former to some extent on the theory that the federal
government may regulate intrastate commerce where such regulation is inciden-
tal to the control of interstate commerce. But jurisdiction over those matters on
which the federal act is silent must remain vested in the states.”).
353 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
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and not affecting commerce.354 Because other aircraft at that
time were not prohibited from going into navigable airspace
and possibly imposing dangers, they were properly regulated by
federal rules. The 1958 Act, and still the U.S. Code today, simi-
larly keeps the same principle. The definition of “air commerce”
includes “the operation of aircraft that directly affects, or may
endanger safety in, foreign or interstate air commerce.”355
Again, aircraft that could enter navigable airspace could cer-
tainly directly affect or endanger aircraft.356
Clearly, the safety of aircraft in navigable airspace could have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Thus, this article
does not take issue with regulating drones that could be allowed
into and out of navigable airspace. In that respect, FAA regula-
tion does not differ in principle from existing controls over heli-
copters, crop dusters, or the like. Those aircraft and the way the
FAA regulates them, however, differ from what the FAA is doing
with sUASs.
Small UASs, unlike any other aircraft, are prohibited from go-
ing above 400 feet, and would, by regulatory definition, be pro-
hibited from ever entering navigable airspace.357 They are even
horizontally prohibited from airports, the downward extension
of navigable airspace.358 Excluding sUASs from navigable air-
space does not mean that there is a comprehensive system envi-
sioned or authorized by Congress to allow the FAA to regulate
solely in non-navigable airspace—where it has never exclusively
regulated before. So although the FAA can properly exclude
354 HOTCHKISS, supra note 62, at 70 (excerpting a statement of the managers of
the 1926 Act: “In order to protect and prevent undue burdens upon interstate
and foreign air commerce the air traffic rules are to apply whether the aircraft is
engaged in commerce or non-commercial or in foreign interstate, or intrastate
navigation in the United States, and whether or not the aircraft is registered or is
navigating in a civil airway.”).
355 49 U.S.C. § 40102(3) (2012).
356 See, e.g., United States v. Red Frame Parasail, Buckeye Model Eagle 503 (se-
rial number 4159), 160 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (D. Ariz. 2001) (finding that ul-
tralight vehicles can be regulated, in part, because of the threat they pose to
aviation safety and consequently interstate commerce); United States v. Drumm,
55 F. Supp. 151, 155 (D. Nev. 1944) (holding that based on the expansive statu-
tory definition of “air commerce,” “. . . either directly affects, or may endanger
safety in, interstate . . . commerce,” it was necessary that all pilots and aircraft be
certified “for the protection of safety in air commerce”).
357 14 C.F.R. § 107.51 (2016) (“Operating Limitations of Small Unmanned
Aircraft.”).
358 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.41, 107.43 (“Operation in Certain Airspace” and “Opera-
tion in the Vicinity of Airports,” respectively).
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sUASs from navigable airspace, and even provide a reasonable
100-foot buffer, there must be a limitation to how much the FAA
can regulate in the non-navigable airspace—if it can regulate
there at all either because of a lack of clear authority or because
it encroaches on the powers reserved to states.359
It remains a constitutional question whether the FAA could
even exclusively regulate all airspace, even with a grant of ex-
plicit authority by Congress. According to the Supreme Court,
courts must make their own independent evaluation of whether
an activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce; in so do-
ing, courts can “consider legislative findings, and indeed even
congressional committee findings, regarding effect[s] on inter-
state commerce.”360 But here, there are none. Regulating in
non-navigable airspace below minimum altitudes of flight has
never been an authority granted to the FAA, nor has it been
discussed in bills that were enacted. Even for towers that might
affect the navigable airspace, the FAA has no authority to pro-
hibit their construction;361 it relies on states to do so.362 Nor
should the FAA rely on the provision in 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2)
that empowers it to protect “individuals and property on the
ground,” because that provision was meant to have a tie to inter-
state commerce and to regulate aircraft in navigable airspace
that might pose such a danger.363
From true versions law, definitive and limited statutory grants
of authority to the navigable airspace, affirming legislative his-
tory, historical context, traditional state powers, past and cur-
rent state laws, and case law, it is clear there is no express or
implied preemption of state laws that prohibit where UAS can
operate in the nonnavigable airspace. States should continue to
pass laws that ensure the safety and privacy of their residents
359 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941) (“[T]he power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause is plenary to exclude any article from in-
terstate commerce subject only to the specific prohibitions of the Constitution.”).
360 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
361 14 C.F.R. § 157.7 (2015) (“While determinations consider the effects of the
proposed [construction] action on the safe and efficient use of airspace by air-
craft and the safety of persons and property on the ground, the determinations are
only advisory.” (emphasis added)).
362 Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass’n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 600 F.2d 965,
966–67 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Once issued, a hazard/no-hazard determination has
no enforceable legal effect. The FAA is not empowered to prohibit or limit pro-
posed construction it deems dangerous to air navigation. Nevertheless, the ruling
has substantial practical impact.”).
363 See supra notes 211–19 and accompanying text.
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from drones. To effectuate their compelling interests, states
have the freedom to, at a minimum, restrict or prohibit UASs
from operating at least up to 500 feet above ground in rural and
non-congested areas, and at least 1,000 feet over any cities or
other congested areas.
